Role playing games, of course, cannot predict the future. They can, however, help elucidate important factors affecting how various actors make decisions. The game played in my class certainly did this.
The current U.N, authorization for the U.S.-led military presence in Iraq will expire at the end of 2008. The U.S. administration of George W. Bush wants to see this replaced with a bilateral Iraqi-American status of forces agreement. Further, it hopes to conclude negotiations with the Iraqi government by July 31 so that there will be sufficient time for the Iraqi parliament to ratify it before the end of the year. (The Bush administration claims that, on the American side, this is an executive agreement, and thus not subject to ratification by the U.S. Senate.) There are, though, many issues that Washington and Baghdad have yet to agree upon.
Because this class was a small one (with only 12 of the 15 enrolled students participating), there were just three teams: America, Iraq, and Iran. The American team consisted of students playing Bush, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, General Petraeus, and Republican presidential nominee John McCain). There was no Senator Obama — though the prospect of his being elected president would loom large in the game.
For the sake of simplicity, the Iraqi team consisted of only Shiite politicians, including students playing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Sadrist trend leader Moqtada Sadr, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, and Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani.
The Iranian team was composed of students playing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Expediency Council chairman (and former president) Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
The game began with the Bush administration asking Iraq to accept current U.S. troop levels (about 160,000), the current number of American bases (over 50), and immunity for both American troops and contractors.
The Iranian team, by contrast, made clear to the Iraqis that Tehran did not want to see a status of forces agreement reached at all.
The Iraqis were divided at first: some preferred renewed U.N. authorization to an Iraqi-American status of forces agreement, others wanted the United States out altogether, while Maliki focused on the terms of a status of forces agreement.
One thing happened that may well happen in real life: the Bush administration's July 31 target date for an agreement was missed. The Americans and the Iraqis remained divided over several issues, including immunity for contractors, how much economic assistance the United States would provide, the duration of the status of forces agreement, American troop levels, and base numbers. The biggest issue, though, was whether the Iraqi government would play a role in approving U.S. military operations – something that the American team was adamantly opposed to and the Iraqi one insistent upon.
Meanwhile, the Iranian team became increasingly annoyed that the Iraqis were in serious discussions with the American team at all. At one point, the student playing Ahmadinejad asked the one playing Maliki, "What can America give you that we can't?" The student playing Maliki replied, "Security from you."
Although it seemed like it would not happen, the Iraqi and American teams finally did reach an agreement on the day before the U.S. presidential elections this coming November.
The terms included: reduction of American forces to 100,000, reduction of American bases to 15, a two-year renewable agreement, $15 billion in U.S. economic aid for each year of the agreement, and no immunity for American contractors.
The issue of what role the Iraqi government would play in U.S. military operations was fudged: Washington agreed to "consult" with Baghdad on this matter, but what this meant was not specified precisely.
Although we did not know it at the time, subsequent news reports suggest that the U.S. and Iraqi governments have agreed on a couple of items that my students agreed upon: a two year agreement, and no immunity for contractors.
While news reports indicate that contractors will be subject to Iraqi law, my students proposed that they come under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. This, of course, is something that the Bush administration is highly unlikely to agree to, but American contractors serving in Iraqi might actually prefer this to being subject to Iraqi law.
In the discussion after the game, the Iraqi team indicated that its motive for accepting a status of forces agreement was the fear that Sen. Barack Obama D-Ill., would be elected president, would pull U.S. forces out of Iraq quickly, and then Iraq would face the threat of Iran on its own.
Will events unfold as my class's role playing game predicted? This remains to be seen. The outcome of the game, however, suggests that the Iraqis will come to value the U.S. presence most only when they come to believe that it really might end.
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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.