The answer to the above questions are those going through the minds of the people tasked with preparing alternative plans should political negotiations lead nowhere – as currently appears to be the case. In that eventuality, upon exhausting all peaceful avenues, there remains "the last resort": military intervention.

"The Last Resort: Consequences of Preventive Military Action Against Iran," is a new study by Patrick Clawson, deputy director for research at The Washington Institute and Michael Eisenstadt, a senior fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute, and a specialist in Persian Gulf and Arab-Israeli security affairs.

The two scholars have looked into the repercussions of military operations to abort Iran's nuclear program, as well as into what is needed for a "successful policy of preventive action."

The authors point to two issues that need to be followed in the event of the United States opting for military action in Iran:

1. The first issue deals with the timing of an eventual operation.

2. How much does the why, when, and how of military action matter in determining the effect on U.S. interests and on the Iranian nuclear program?

Additionally, the authors ask what nonmilitary steps would be needed to accompany military action to constitute a comprehensive strategy?

While Clawson and Eisenstadt feel that the time is not right for such a decision, and diplomacy continues to offer at least a modest prospect of success, as late as Wednesday U.S. President George W. Bush reiterated his longstanding policy that all "options remain on the table, including the military one."

Among other reasons given by the authors of the report in discouraging a military strike on Iran is the responsibility of striking "without knowing whether the United States has the sensitive target intelligence needed for such a hit."

However, according to the two authors it is simply a matter of time because as they point out, "sometime, sooner or later the time will be right to strike at Iran." That being the case the time to assess the consequences of such a policy is now rather than later.

It goes without saying that any preventive military action against the Islamic republic does not come without its fair share of risks. As the authors elucidate, "No guarantee exists that Iran's nuclear infrastructure would be destroyed, that significant delays would be imposed on the program, or that destabilizing Iranian responses could be averted."

And perhaps one question – though one of paramount importance – that has yet to be answered, is the following: "Does the United States [or Israel] have the intelligence needed to hit the right targets?" And if the answer is an unequivocal 100 percent 'yes,' it raises further questions.

"Does either have the means to destroy those parts of the nuclear infrastructure located in hardened, buried facilities? Is there an optimal moment to strike? And when is it too late?"

Additionally, not to be ignored, are Iran's domestic politics and how a strike by a foreign power would impact it policies. Chances are that the country's youth – being fiercely nationalistic, and who constitute the majority of the population – would rally behind the central government, thus giving President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad an enormous political bonus.

For the unpopular president of the Islamic republic, a foreign military intervention against his country would be nothing short of a godsend.

Furthermore, as Clawson and Eisenstadt make abundantly clear, "If the United States were to undertake preventive action without corroborative data from the International Atomic Energy Agency, a subsequent Iranian decision to rebuild its nuclear program or openly pursue nuclear weapons might receive a sympathetic hearing in the court of world opinion.

For the moment, however, the situation remains very much in the 'what if' mode.