In the recent past, there has been a first and second crown prince in Saudi Arabia. Upon ascending to the throne, a new Saudi king would ratify his predecessor's choice of second crown prince as the new first crown prince, and then select a new second crown prince himself. But as the many sons of Saudi Arabia's founder, King Abdel Aziz al-Saud, grow older, succession will at some point have to devolve from his sons to his grandsons.

Many thought that this would prove difficult for the Saudi royal family. It could make an enormous difference which grandson is first selected, and if he appointed his own full brothers or even his sons as crown princes.

But as a new report by Awadh al-Badi of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh suggests, the new Allegiance (or Baya) Commission appointed by King Abdullah in December 2007 will alleviate this concern.

Badi's report is entitled, "Institutionalizing Hereditary Succession in Saudi Arabia's Political Governance System: The Allegiance Commission." It was published in February 2008 by the Arab Reform Initiative, which is based in Paris.

King Abdullah appointed 35 members to the Commission. Sixteen of them are sons of the founding king while the 19 others are his grandsons. Basically, a grandson serves in place of a son who is either deceased or unable to serve. One son each of the current king and crown prince (both of whom, of course, are also grandsons of the founding king) are also members.

Prince Sultan was named second crown prince by Abdullah's predecessor, King Fahd. Abdullah confirmed Sultan as heir to the throne, but did not name a second crown prince. When Sultan or anyone else becomes king, he will not name the new crown prince on his own. Instead, after consulting with the Allegiance Commission, he will choose one, two or three candidates for crown prince. The Allegiance Commission will then choose. It can even reject the king's nominees and designate someone else. The king, in turn, can reject the commission's nominee. But it is the Commission which will then choose between the king's and its own nominee, thus having the final word.

The advantage of this system is that once a grandson is finally chosen to be king, he will be unable to monopolize further succession in his particular branch of the royal family. Indeed, the Allegiance Commission can be expected to select a crown prince from a different branch than that of a new king in order to maintain harmony.

The Allegiance Commission, of course, is not a democratic institution and does not presage democratization in the kingdom. It is, however, a more open and transparent means of determining succession than exists in most of the Arab "republics." Some of these appear to have become "hereditary presidencies" where the top job is passed from father to son, but where subsequent succession is completely unclear. In others, succession is determined in an opaque power struggle upon the demise of the outgoing president, if not beforehand. Succession struggles have also occurred in other Arab monarchies, and could well do so again. Even where succession is clear, but royal families are small, much depends on the leadership capacity of the very few people eligible to inherit power.

The Saudi royal family seems likely to avoid these pitfalls not just through being large and thus having a larger pool of potential leaders, but also through now having a mechanism to better identify and select its leaders. Like other Arab states, Saudi Arabia has many problems and its future is unclear. If the new Allegiance Commission works the way it is supposed to, though, the kingdom appears less likely to experience succession struggles than other Arab states.

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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.