Before Iraq's attempt at democratization, a Sunni Arab minority held sway over the Shiite Arab majority and a Kurdish minority. Elections in Iraq have led to a Shiite-dominated government fearful that the Sunnis will attempt a comeback, as well as Sunni fears of marginalization and dispossession, and Kurdish separatism.

The situation in Iraq, unfortunately, is not all that exceptional in the Arab world. There are other countries there where a minority exercises authoritarian rule over the majority, where separatist sentiment exists, or both. As in Iraq, any attempt to democratize them threatens to turn ruling minorities into oppressed ones and/or bring about a breakup of the country.

Lebanon's attempt at democratization has already run afoul of that country's sharp confessional cleavages.

In Syria, democratization would end the domination of the minority Alawites (a Shiite offshoot) upon which the Assad regime is based over the Sunni majority.

In Jordan, democratization would lead to the Palestinian majority in that country taking power from the indigenous "Bedouin" minority which underpins the Hashemite monarchy.

In Saudi Arabia, the royal family's roots are based in the central province of Najd. Democratization could lead to Hejazis, Asiris, and Shiites either taking power from them, or seceding.

In Bahrain, democratization would lead to the Shiite majority taking power from the Sunni minority, which the royal family there comes from.

In Oman, democratization could result in the Sunni majority displacing the minority Ibadis (a third branch of Islam found mainly in Oman), from which the ruling family there comes.

Democratization in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates would be problematic, because their citizens are outnumbered by non-citizens.

In Yemen, democratization could result in the diminution of the Hashid tribal confederation's influence, which Yemen's long-time president, Ali Abdallah Saleh, comes from.

In Sudan, democratization might not end, but could reinforce the efforts of its restive provinces -- southern Sudan and Darfur -- to secede.

Democratization in Algeria could result in Berber demands for self-rule -- or even independence.

Previous U.S. administrations were fearful that such problems could arise in Arab countries, and thus sought to avoid them through support for pro-American authoritarian governments, and even tolerance of anti-American ones.

Bush, by contrast, appears more aware of the corrosive impact on Arab public opinion that supporting Arab dictatorships has had. But, he did not anticipate the problems that attempting democratization has led to in Iraq and could well lead to elsewhere.

But just as Bush's enthusiasm for democratization in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip quickly cooled when parliamentary elections there were won by Hamas, his support for it elsewhere also will probably diminish when he realizes what the outcome of it may actually be.

The next administration -- whether Democrat or Republican -- may return to the "tried and true" policy of supporting pro-American dictatorships and tolerating anti-American ones, in order to avoid the conflicts that would result from ruling minorities being displaced by angry majorities and from secessionist movements asserting themselves.

It is highly unlikely, though, that such a policy can maintain the authoritarian stability that has long held sway in the Middle East. For the Bush administration's own policy in Iraq has demonstrated that ruling minorities can be overthrown and that regionally dominant minorities such as the Kurds can achieve de facto (even if not de jure) independence.

Further, the desire of oppressed majorities to come to power in countries long ruled by minorities, and for oppressed minorities to exercise self-determination in regions they are a majority in, is only likely to strengthen and grow, whether Washington supports democratization in the Middle East or not.

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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.