The consequences of the surge are continually debated and will probably be debated until history becomes tired of the word.

A large body of opinion declares the surge decreased casualties, diminished the Iraq insurgency, brought stability to Baghdad and Basra, and assisted the Sunni Awakening movement to pacify Anbar province.

Another large body of opinion asserts the surge has not created a definite direction for ethnic and political reconciliation.

Surge promoters, please enter John McCain, claim that political reconciliation will still take time and that the local pacifications due to the additional U.S. fighting forces have provided a breathing space and have set the stage for the eventual reconciliations.

Unfortunately, the claim proceeds from an incomplete analysis. The surge has brought some stability to some areas, but that stability is only one aspect of the reconciliation process. Side effects of the surge have produced additional ethnic separations and sectarian manifestations - conditions that impede national reconciliation.

Former Iraq interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, a strong voice from Iraq's opposition to Saddam Hussein, a shadowy figure among intelligence agencies that distributed false reports about Saddam's nuclear weapons potential, and a leading figure of the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority, stressed at an 'on the record' Carnegie Middle East Center meeting, July 25, 2008, that there can be no political stability without ethnic reconciliation and no reconciliation without a government that is non-sectarian.

"Reconciliation is a must and the only way, but comes from institutions that are constructed with a non-sectarian base." Allawi, who is a secular Shiite, also said that "if there is no political gain, there will be a reversal in the military gain."

Allawi's contentions that "re-conciliation is a must and the only way, but comes from institutions that are constructed with a non-sectarian base," seems sensible, accurate and a pre-requisite for Iraq to become a successful state. However, the opposite has occurred.

The surge battles, which started during February 2007, coincided with and contributed greatly to the formation of many of the 2 million internally displaced and another 2 million externally displaced Iraqis. Most of the displaced persons are of Sunni origin and many have lost their homes in Baghdad to rival Shiites.

The surge constructed walls that separate Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad, but did not stop the Shiite dominated government from continuing its sectarian appearance by encouraging support from Shiite dominated Iran.

Sunnis reacted by fortifying themselves with U.S. assistance, which began during the surge when the United States awakened to the allegiance between Iraqi and Iranian Shiites.

Saudi Arabia's leaders, who shake at the mention of the word 'Shia,' have indicated a willingness to polarize the factions further by assisting the Sunnis "to prevent Iranian-backed Shiite militias from harming Iraqi Sunnis once the U.S. begins pulling out of Iraq." (The Washington Post on Nov. 29, 2007)

Add these surge induced problems to unresolved problems - control of Kirkuk and Mosul, unceasing terrorist attacks, and lessening but still existing sectarian government militias, and surge success becomes questionable.

Four million displaced persons, physical walls of separation, a strong Sunni militia controlling Anbar province, and continued violence in several provinces don't suggest reconciliation or an approach for building institutions that are non-sectarian.

A reduction in the number of militias has been accompanied by a shift in the strength and realignment of the militias. Much has been made of the cordial arrangement between the sahwa or Awakening Movement that has pacified Anbar province and U.S. military forces, and that its militia, the Sons of Iraq are being incorporated into the Shiite led Iraqi army.

Not well publicized is that:

(1) The sahwa movements, of which there are several, has been described by Stéphane Lacroix, a lecturer at the prestigious Paris Institute of Political Studies, as "an amalgam of Saudi religious thinking and the philosophy of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood."

The Iraq Sunni movement, which also contains some Shiites, has more of a nationalist description without the Radical Muslim trappings, but who knows?

(2) General Petraeus has been quoted as saying that the Sons of Iraq would stay loyal to the course the United States has set "as long as it is in their interests," and

(3) Shiites composed most of Saddam's military, but were led by Sunni officers who controlled their activities. Now it is the reverse and just as ominous.

Realignment of forces without reconciliation of populations spells confrontation. A surge that made all this possible seems to have made reconciliation less possible, which translates into a 'surge" that has provided additional obstacles to peace and stability.

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Dan Lieberman is the editor of Alternative Insight, a monthly web based newsletter. He can be reached at alternativeinsight@earthlink.net