Hours after declaring Hezbollah's communication network illegal and purging the airport security chief, the pro-Western March 14 forces suffered a serious blow on the streets of Beirut. They learned that the United States will not cover for their actions when clashes break out. Rhetoric was not enough. They had to back off.

No Lebanese person would argue the right of a government to be sovereign on its own territory and no one would accept the unjustified reaction of Hezbollah that raises questions about its national temper and the raison d'etre for its weaponry and resistance label.

But the decision of the government last Monday was unwise, to say the least. It was made by a council of ministers with questionable legitimacy, in a country embattled in political stalemate, using a system unable even to elect a president, and in a region awaiting a pretext for war.

This same government sought to address a strategic divisive issue that an Israeli summer war did not even start a dialogue about. It made a decision to prosecute, with no ability to implement whatsoever, members of an armed confessional group in a sectarian political system.

Hamas, Jaysh al-Mahdi and now Hezbollah have each taken the streets to change the status quo and simply got away with it, and improved their terms for negotiation.

When Hamas took over Gaza, Washington came up with two policy actions: encourage economic prosperity in the West Bank to contrast Gaza's isolation, and push forward a peace track to embolden the Palestinian Authority.

Now what to do with Lebanon? Which way to go: a sustained and managed conflict or a compromise? For how long can March 14 leaders under siege survive a conflict, and can Iran and Syria be taken from the picture so that a compromise be made?

A senior U.S. official, who held a roundtable recently to discuss Lebanon, was seemingly cautious and hesitant. In a tone adaptive to the turn of events, he argued that Iran and Syria did not want a civil war in Lebanon and described clashes as "a political fight not a coup d'etat."

Washington is idle in its response to Hezbollah's "show of force," resorting to the usual policy tools it has in changing circumstances on the ground, and seemed not rushed to find a way out, since "the story is not over."

The George W. Bush administration is putting its confidence now in three trump cards: relying on Lebanon's demography to restrain Hezbollah, Arabs ratcheting up pressure on Syria, and the Lebanese army protecting the governmental institutions.

The rest is diplomatic routine to rally international support.

The same demographic dimension, that Washington believes would restrain Hezbollah behavior, further limits American policy options and its room for maneuver in Lebanon.

The Arab League failed to come up with a strong voice and vision leading into the crisis as it unfolded, because of Syria's stance backed by other allies.

Saudi-Iranian rapprochement has been the key to stability in Lebanon since 2006, as a replacement for Syrian-Saudi synergy that was embodied by Rafik Hariri before his assassination in 2005.

But the Saudis recently lost sight of the regional picture and became understandably more frustrated and impatient with Tehran. The two countries need to sit down again to address the Lebanese crisis.

Furthermore, Cairo is a gateway to broker talks with Damascus, using the same model it is applying with Hamas. This, in order to preserve the interests and gains made by March 14 in the last two years, before it is too late; and in return to put the Hariri tribunal on the back-burner for the time being until a court is established and the facts are set straight.

The resignation of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora would not be a good idea right now. Retaining him will avoid a scenario in which the military would be pushed to the forefront of the nation's chaotic political scene.

What is crucial, though, is to forge an imminent deal to elect army chief Michel Suleiman and pass the 1960 electoral law, and both in the same parliamentary session.

Damascus has been under mounting pressure since the second half of 2007. This it has felt most strongly after a U.S. flirtation with Syria, following the Annapolis conference, failed to entice Damascus to break away from its strategic alliance with Iran.

Last September, Israel launched an air attack on an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor at Dayr al-Zur. In December, Paris suspended talks with Damascus on Lebanon. That was followed in February by the assassination of a senior Hezbollah leader in the capital. In February, the warship USS COLE was sent to the Lebanese coast, where it remains to this day. Diplomatic pressure was employed in the lead up to and during the annual Arab Summit in Damascus. And most recently, Washington released documents claiming Syrian nuclear ties with North Korea.

Iran's regional umbrella and Syria's authoritarian behavior in Lebanon undoubtedly reflect a negative input in Lebanese politics. But the drama in "moderate" Arab countries over Iran's influence in the Arab world is not helping the construction of a sober regional policy to deal with Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine.

Stability in the Levant cannot occur without engaging Iran and Syria. This is a sad reality that Washington must face while it fumbles in Iraq.

The Bush administration has lost the luxury of time, but its policy during the last phase in office will define its regional legacy in many ways.

If the United States does not intend to engage in war with Syria and Iran while at the same time failing to keep sufficient diplomatic pressure on them, U.S. interests in the region will be at risk.

In which case, it will take someone in Washington to start thinking outside the box and beyond short-term political gains.

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Joe Macaron is a journalist residing in Washington.