Misperceptions in the United States are far too often witnessed when pertaining to the realities grasping Iraq, not to exclude the political culture of the Greater Middle East. In many respects, America's unfortunate circumstance in post-Saddam Iraq can be largely due to a fundamental perceptual error in its war preparations – the idea that coalition forces were going to be greeted as 'liberators', not occupiers. But since last September, America has been at risk in making another judgmental error – this time based on misrepresentations assigned to the U.S. 'surge' strategy.

"So far what has been achieved resembles a ceasefire more than a real peace," said Barham Saleh, Iraq's deputy prime minister, during an interview earlier this year.

Saleh, one of Iraq's more intelligent and able politicians, was referring to the security improvements noticed in Iraq due to the U.S. strategy. But his wise observation had contradicted those being made in the United States, not just by administration officials and presidential candidates, but oddly enough the media as well.

For some time now, the American media has inconveniently become lazy in reporting developments unfolding in Iraq. Primary elections, debates, and the economy, have all demanded more time and cover stories at the expense of the war. Perhaps the main reason for undercutting Iraq was that the counter-insurgency strategy was succeeding and the United States was described as winning. But that belief was based off an ill understanding of the political realities shaping Iraq.

During the American news coverage devoted to the 'surge is working', the question that was not scrutinized was erroneously presumed as a given: Is the U.S. counter-insurgency strategy directly causing the decline of violence inside Iraq? Though consensus in the media had acknowledged Iraq's improvements, they had unknowingly misplaced the causational factors linked to the optimistic security statistics – hence a perceptual error that was slightly corrected only after witnessing the latest resurge of violence in Basra.

Throughout the strategy's implementation, the presence of additional U.S. troops had only represented a secondary factor in contributing to the decline of violence inside Iraq. Instead, the main variables were contingent on aspects outside the sphere of American control.

For instance, many militiamen inside Iraq had decided to become temporarily inactive for the duration of the troop surge. Since August 2007, one crucial factor has been Moqtada Sadr's self-imposed ceasefire on his Jaysh al-Mahdi militia, which was extended last February for another six months.

The other main security contributor was the formation of Iraq's Awakening councils. An anti-al-Qaida project originating in Anbar province, the Awakening has rapidly grown to a 90,000-strong Sunni-dominated national movement. Paid by the U.S. military, they are essentially yesterday's terrorists and highly suspected as such by Shiites, Kurds, and Sunnis.

After the recent congressional testimony delivered by U.S. General David Petraeus on Iraqi progress, many politicians and media pundits had viewed his report as contradictory: the idea that the surge was working and Iraq was making progress, yet a withdrawal in troop levels would be unwise.

This criticism highlights the misperception that many in Washington have about the realities in Iraq. Though now a disgraced Iraqi politician, Ahmad Chalabi had accurately portrayed, "The problem in Iraq is that the agenda is driven not by what is really happening, but by the perception in America of what is happening." It is imperative for the American public not to misinterpret the improving security statistics as a condition for withdrawal.

The American funding and supplying of former Sunni insurgents has helped the Awakening movement hastily grow to a substantial force, threatening the Jaysh al-Mahdi and others – defining them now as second-class militias. The Awakening councils are demanding to be integrated into Iraq's security forces, with permanent jobs and pay.

But Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government is resisting that call, claiming that the councils have been largely former terrorists and infiltrated by al-Qaida. The Sunni bloc has mutually expressed deep concern over the councils over their demand for a political role, which would be at the expense of already established Sunni parties.

If the Awakening councils are left out to dry, the current U.S. strategy is in risk of becoming a similar story witnessed in Afghanistan. The plan then was to initially buy off insurgents to later only have them gradually integrate back to the Taliban when the money stopped coming in.

Reports indicate that the targeting of Awakening members is initiating dangerous pressure and doubts from within the fragile tribal coalition. If Awakening demands are not met soon, impatient commanders of tens of thousands of former insurgents had indicated they would rejoin the insurgency and ally themselves back with al-Qaida.

Sadr's February decision to extend his ceasefire had further contributed to his militia's fragmentation, as many Sadrists were dissatisfied with their leader's judgment. If the Awakening movement begins to splinter and rejoin the insurgency, Sadr may scrap his passive agreement to balance against Sunni resurgence.

The latest clash between Shiite militiamen and Iraqi forces in Basra illustrates the delicacy of the ceasefire. In preventing the Jaysh al-Mahdi from disintegrating, Sadr may reactivate his militia in order to save face among religious Shiites as a credible leader.

His recent statement issued a "final warning" to the Iraqi government, threatening that if victimization toward his followers does not stop, "we will declare an open war until liberation." This dangerous ultimatum highlights Sadr's desperation to salvage his authority over his militia – a powerful leverage he is not likely to yield.

The progress that had been reported by the American media simply does not represent a real and genuine trend, but rather a coincidence promoted by a collage of factors. Regardless of what the statistics tell us, Iraq could easily slip back to pre-surge status, as its improving security is only superficial and dependent on volatile variables. With provincial elections and Article 140 – which deals with the status of Kirkuk – scheduled for debate later this year, the sensitivity of these issues is likely to negatively seep into the security domain.

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Ramzy Mardini is a terrorism analyst writing on security and Middle Eastern affairs for The Jamestown Foundation. He was previously Special Assistant on Iranian Studies at the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman and a former Iraq Desk Officer for Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. He has also served within the Executive Office of the President in Washington, D.C.