Monday's announcement by Riyadh that neither King Abdullah nor Prince Saud al-Faisal will be attending this weekend's Arab League summit in Damascus should come as no surprise given deteriorating relations of late between the two regimes. Indeed, the Saudi snub is just the latest in a round of tit for tat reprisals in a squabble that has lasted more than three years and that has significant regional implications.
Saudi Arabia was once the Syrian regime's biggest supporter, providing aid to Damascus to the tune of millions of dollars during the first Gulf War as a reward for Syrian membership of the U.S.-led coalition against Saddam.
However, relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia have been steadily worsening ever since Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000. Once considered sister countries, the traditional Arab alliance between Syria and Saudi Arabia has begun to fray due to differences stemming from foreign policy.
(While Syria's population is overwhelmingly Sunni, it is governed by Alawites, an off-shoot of Shiism.) At issue is Saudi disapproval of Syrian policy toward three key countries: Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran.
No subject has proven more central to the unraveling of this relationship than that of Lebanon. Relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia began to decline markedly after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. A longstanding friend of the Saudi royal family, King Abdullah saw Damascus' hand at work in Hariri's death. The Saudis have since been frustrated by Syrian attempts to block the selection of a replacement for Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, whose term ended last November.
The Syrian regime in turn is annoyed by what it perceives to be Saudi meddling in Lebanese affairs, and thus by association, Syrian affairs. This includes Riyadh's support for UN Security Council Resolution No. 1559 which called for Syrian troops to withdraw from Lebanon as well as Saudi backing of a tribunal to investigate Hariri's murder that could implicate senior regime officials.
In August 2006, the rift between the two countries grew deeper after Assad gave a speech criticizing Arab leaders for their failure to support Hezbollah in the summer war with Israel, calling them "half-men." King Abdullah was reported to be particularly incensed by the comments. In the ensuing months, the Syrian and Saudi press engaged in a heated war of words, further ratcheting up tensions between the two capitals.
Relations briefly improved the following March after Assad moved to quell the crisis in an interview with the Saudi daily Al-Jazeera. In it, the Syrian president sought to soothe rising tensions by describing ties between the two countries as "historic" and "longstanding" and recounting his warm feelings for the Saudi ruler. Additional statements in support of Syrian-Saudi relations were made by the Syrian information minister and minister of expatriate affairs around the same time. The statements, which seemed to hint at a brief thaw, paved the way for Assad's attendance later that month at the annual Arab League summit in Riyadh.
In addition to differing views over who should govern Lebanon, the Saudi government has been frustrated with Syrian policy toward Iraq. Saudi perceptions of Syrian complacency toward the cross border traffic of Saudi jihadists into Iraq tops the list of Riyadh's grievances on this front.
Frequent reports that Saudi men make up the majority of foreign fighters in Iraq have embarrassed the Saudis who are eager to downplay this fact. So far, however, Syrian authorities have only repatriated about 40 Saudi insurgents. This latter grievance may have moved to the back burner following U.S. reports that the number of insurgents crossing the border from Syria into Iraq has fallen drastically in the past year, however.
Despite Syrian overtures at reconciliation, the Saudis were noticeably absent from a neighbors meeting on Iraqi security hosted by the Damascus regime last August. In what has now become a pattern, Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Shara responded to the perceived snub by delivering a speech highly critical of the Saudi government. In it, he accused the kingdom of failing to fulfill its role in the region.
In a further public affront to the Saudi state, he declared that the collapse of the Mecca Accord (the February 2007 unity agreement between Fatah and Hamas, brokered by Riyadh) had left the country "semi-paralyzed." In response, the Saudi media launched a fierce attack against the regime and Shara, speculating openly that the former foreign minister was suffering from mental problems. Former ambassador to the United States Prince Turki al-Faisal even went so far as to hint on Saudi television that perhaps it was time to consider a regime change in Damascus.
Given this recent history, Riyadh's insistence that the White House invite Damascus to last November's Middle East summit in Annapolis seems odd. Yet the Saudis may have viewed the meeting as a last ditch attempt to bring the Syrians back into the fold. Along with Washington and other Arab capitals, Riyadh has become more and more worried by the increasingly close ties between Syria and Iran as of late.
At the heart of Riyadh's uneasiness over Syrian policies toward Lebanon and Iraq is an underlying fear that both are somehow linked to Iran's rising influence in the region. Throughout the Middle East, and indeed beyond, a Shiite revival in Iraq and elsewhere is seen as having catapulted Iran to the fore while relegating Saudi Arabia and the Sunnis to the background.
Although Syria has maintained cordial relations with Iran for years, the relationship has deepened as Syria's ties to Saudi Arabia have frayed.
These days the Syrian regime is actively embracing Tehran, welcoming Iranian investment and delegations with increasing frequency. Economic ties between the two countries have grown significantly in the past three years. Last year, trade between Syria and Iran reached $240 million, up from only $65 million two years earlier.
Cultural ties have also increased with up to half a million Iranian pilgrims visiting holy sites in Syria annually. On the political front, the two countries announced the formation of a "United Front" against common challenges in 2005. In July, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad paid a congratulatory visit to Syria as part of celebrations in honor of Assad's reelection. These days, hardly a month passes without the arrival of an Iranian delegation of some sort in Damascus.
Ironically, however, Saudi criticism of Syrian positions on Iraq and Lebanon may only have served to further isolate Damascus, pushing it into Tehran's welcoming arms. Earlier this month Iran and Syria signed eight memoranda of understanding on issues ranging from energy to healthcare. Total Iranian investment in Syria in recent years is estimated at $1.5 billion and is expected to surpass $10 billion by 2012.
Seen in this wider strategic context, the current rift between Syria and Saudi Arabia is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. Last December, during a fiery end of year press conference, U.S. President George W. Bush publicly scolded Assad for destabilizing Lebanon and allowing suicide bombers to enter Iraq from his country. Likewise, King Abdullah may be using this week's summit to signal once and for all that his patience with the Syrian leader has finally run out.
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Sara Bjerg Moller is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations.