But while these might be Russia's aims in other parts of the world, there is strong reason to doubt whether Moscow is trying to achieve them in the Middle East. For if these are its goals, the Putin administration has certainly not acted very effectively to achieve them. I will argue here that this is not because it has tried and failed to do so, but that Moscow not only has not tried but also does not want either to reduce American influence or to act as the predominant great power in the Middle East.

This argument, I believe, can best be made through comparing current Russian foreign policy toward the Middle East with Soviet foreign policy toward the region in the latter Brezhnev era - a time when the Soviet Union was arguably at its strongest and when it was unquestionably pursuing great power ambitions as well as challenging the U.S. for influence in the region.

In 1982, Moscow and Washington each had a distinct set of allies and adversaries throughout the Middle East. Very few countries were either allied to both or were adversaries with both. Of course, different years in the Cold War would have shown different alliance/adversary relationships with the U.S. and USSR than in 1982, but at any given point during this period the countries there were usually allied with one and adversaries with the other. (There were, of course, a few exceptions: Kuwait and North Yemen were allies with both superpowers while Iran and Hezbollah were adversaries of both.)

In 2007, Washington still has a distinct set of allies and a distinct set of adversaries in the Middle East. Indeed, its allies and adversaries in 2007 were mostly (though not completely) the same as they were in 1982. By contrast, while Moscow had both allies and adversaries in the Middle East in 1982, it has friendly relations with every government and even major opposition movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah in 2007. The only exceptions are al-Qaida and its affiliates.

What does this say about Putin's foreign policy toward the Middle East? On the one hand, he seems to be far more successful than Brezhnev was in 1982 — or Moscow was at any time during the Cold War. It is, after all, more advantageous to be friends with virtually everyone (except the one party - al-Qaida - that virtually nobody else is friends with) than to be friends with only some states in the region and adversaries with others.

In addition, friendly Russian ties with America's Middle Eastern allies raises the prospect of Moscow gaining influence with them at America's expense. Moscow's now having friendly relations with nearly all Middle Eastern governments while Washington does not may also put Russia in a better position than the U.S. to serve as a mediator for the Middle East's many disputes - just like the U.S. was regarded by most Arab states after Moscow broke relations with Israel in 1967.

On the other hand, Russia is not in a position to replace the U.S. as the predominant great power in the region. For while Moscow may have better relations with more governments there than the U.S. does, not one of them can count on Russia to defend it if attacked - not even the anti-American ones. This also explains why there is no real possibility for Moscow to replace Washington as the primary ally of those Middle Eastern states that are closely aligned with the U.S. For no matter now frustrated they may be with American foreign policy, their security would not be enhanced by trading their alliances with Washington for ones with Moscow. Anti-American regimes in the Middle East have no illusions that Moscow will protect them either.

It is not clear, though, that Putin is even trying to displace the U.S. as the predominant power in the Middle East. For while Moscow has joined many of Washington's Middle East allies in complaining about American foreign policy and Russian firms have sought to gain commercial advantages (especially in the petroleum sector) in these countries, it does not appear to be in Russia's interests to disrupt these countries' alliances with the U.S. Indeed, the continuation of their alliances with the U.S. serves to protect Russia's growing investments in these countries. A disruption of America's alliance with any of them, by contrast, either risks or could occur as a result of the rise to power of a new regime hostile not just to America, but to Russia as well.

Indeed, this is the kernel of the foreign policy problem Moscow now faces in the Middle East: the decline of American influence there may actually hurt Russian interests in the region, not help them. Even with the heavy American military presence in the region, the U.S. is clearly having difficulties containing al-Qaida and its affiliates. These Islamic extremist forces would undoubtedly be even less contained if, for example, America withdrew from Iraq.

Further, the Kremlin is well aware that al-Qaida and its affiliates have not forgotten about Chechnya or their other differences with Moscow, and that they might well target Russian interests - or even Russia itself - if America left Iraq.

Nor is Russia eager to take over from America the leading role in the fight against al-Qaida. That being the case, Putin's policy of befriending virtually everyone in the Middle East can be understood as directed more against al-Qaida and its affiliates than against the U.S. For despite all their differences with one another, all existing Middle Eastern governments have reason to fear al-Qaida. Even radical opposition movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah have had their differences with it. It also makes sense for Moscow to want the U.S. to stay in the region both to undertake the main burden of fighting against al-Qaida and its affiliates, and to deflect their attention away from Russia.

While Putin has become increasingly critical of American "hegemony," the strong American presence in the Middle East definitely serves to protect Russian interests there. Indeed, Moscow would be hard pressed to protect those interests if this American presence declined.

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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University. This is a summary of a presentation he made on Nov. 16 in New Orleans at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies National Convention.