That being said, one generalization that seems to be true of tribes is that they can and do ally with others to achieve their goals. Their alliances, though, are fluid and often temporary - not fixed and permanent. They understand - even expect - both that those who are friends now may become adversaries later, and those who are adversaries now may become friends later. When their own interests change, their alliance patterns change. They expect others to behave similarly.

"Either you are with us or you are with them," is not how they view alliances.

"The enemy of my enemy is my friend," captures their attitude better - but only in conjunction with another aphorism: "When the purpose of an alliance comes to an end, the alliance itself comes to an end." (Perhaps a better way of phrasing this might be: "When my enemy is no longer my enemy, my friend may no longer be my friend.")

Further, it is local concerns that mainly drive tribal alliances patterns, not larger conflicts. The existence of larger conflicts, though, allow tribes to obtain assistance from one side - or even both - in them. As Oxford anthropologist (and noted expert on the tribes of Yemen) Paul Dresch put it: "[C]ontests among people in the same moral system are sometimes all that matters, and states, even empires with their grand pretensions, become pawns in games of local interest ... and in the name of Islam or the nation or revolution, not tribalism, one can turn against immediate kin and neighbors. Two brothers at odds may seek help, perhaps, from different governments." (A History of Modern Yemen, 2000, p. 25).

This last point is important to keep in mind. For not only are tribes in competition with others (including other tribes), but there is often competition within tribes for leadership of them. A tribal leader who receives support from any outside party may find that his rivals seek support from its adversaries.

Finally, tribes are aware of their weakness vis-à-vis outsiders. They understand that if the contest between rival parties ends in the victory of one side and the defeat of the other, their own room for maneuver may be sharply curtailed or even eliminated. Tribes, then, do not want this happen - and will do what they can to make sure it does not. But if it does, they will be on the alert for the possibility of other outside parties still. For there are no shortage of conflicts among larger parties that they can potentially take advantage of.

Implications for Iraq

When American forces first intervened in Iraq, it is not surprising that the Sunni tribes in Anbar and elsewhere fought against them. The downfall of Saddam Hussein meant the end of the privileged status that many Sunni tribes had under him. America's democratization efforts leading to the rise of the previously suppressed Shi'as also frightened the Sunnis. Indeed, these Sunni tribes initially saw al-Qaida in Iraq and similar organizations as allies against the U.S.

However, al-Qaida in Iraq, the "Islamic State of Iraq," and similar groups also view alliances in stark, "Either you are with us or you are with them" terms. Indeed, their attitude on this score is more extreme still, and can be summed up as, "Either you become one of us or you are an enemy."

Although there were certainly other contributing factors, al-Qaida in Iraq's viciousness toward them played a large role in the decision of many Sunni tribes in Anbar and elsewhere to cooperate with American forces against it.

American willingness in turn to cooperate with Sunni tribes which previously fought against U.S. forces also displayed sensitivity to tribal politics as well as pragmatism.

How long, though, will this alliance between the U.S. and the Sunni tribes last?

The aphorism, "When the purpose of an alliance comes to an end, the alliance itself comes to an end," suggests that if the common enemy (in this case, al-Qaida in Iraq and its allies) are defeated, the alliance between the Sunni tribes and the U.S. may become attenuated. Conflict may even reemerge.

The Sunnis, though, will have other opponents - the most likely being the Shi'a dominated government.

If the U.S. strongly backs the Shi'a dominated government against them, the Sunni tribes would definitely look for other allies in their conflict with it.

This does not seem likely, though, as the U.S. has shifted from supporting a strong national government to supporting a more federal system with strong regions, and trying to reconcile the two levels.

While the Sunni tribes may now see the Shi'a government as their principal opponent and are undoubtedly unhappy about American support for it, there are many tribal leaders who seem to understand that maintaining good relations with the U.S. provides an important incentive to the U.S. for moderating the Shi'a government's behavior toward them. On the other hand, even if the Sunni tribes continue to closely cooperate with the U.S., this will not preclude them from seeking support from other parties - including ones that Washington might not like - against the Shi'a government. They want to keep their options open whether or not the U.S. remains in Iraq, but especially if they think it might not.

The bottom line with regard to the Sunni tribes in Iraq is that they are not so much with us or against us, but for themselves.

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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.