The general thinking was that Lebanon had no serious contention with Israel, other than paying lip service to the Arab cause and not wanting to rile the 350,000 Palestinian refugees who had sought "temporary" shelter in the country; and most important, no Lebanese government was eager to get on Syria's bad side any more than was absolutely necessary.

However, a lot of water has flowed under the bridges in the last 40 or so years, as well as a lot of blood. Since the June 1967 Six-Day War between Israel on one side and Syria, Egypt and Jordan on the other, a war that Lebanon managed to stay out of, much has changed in Lebanese-Israeli relations.

First, the arrival and deployment of tens of thousands of armed Palestinian commandos in Lebanon after their expulsion from Jordan in September 1970 by King Hussein, has raised tensions between the Lebanese state and the Palestinian resistance, who began acting much as a state within a state. The Fedayeen practically took over huge swaths of southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa Valley, turning it into what colloquially became known as "Fatahland," so named after Yasser Arafat's group, the largest of a multitude of armed organizations that established themselves in Lebanon.

The presence of the Palestinian resistance in the country, and attacks carried out by those groups on Israeli settlements and towns in the Galilee, resulted in Israeli military strikes on towns and villages in Fatahland. More often than not, the majority of the casualties were innocent Lebanese civilians, usually Shiite villagers from the south. This resulted in greater animosity between the Lebanese and Palestinians, but also between Lebanon and Israel.

Eventually, an Israeli commando raid into the very heart of Beirut in April 1973, led by Ehud Barak, a man who would later become prime minister of Israel, set the fuse for a major confrontation between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian resistance.

Arab mediation had the Lebanese government sign the Melkart Agreement (named after the Beirut hotel where the talks were held) as a supplement to the existing Cairo Accords signed a few years earlier. Both treaties gave the Palestinians unprecedented rights to conduct themselves in a manner that no other Arab country would have agreed to.

Inevitably, this led to the 1975 civil war in which the Palestinian resistance played a major role. And when a radical Palestinian group tried to assassinate Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador to Britain in June 1982, it unleashed the full brunt of Israel's military machine, led by then minister of defense Ariel Sharon, who pushed all the way to Beirut, forcing the Palestine Liberation Organization to seek exile in Tunisia.

The respite from the Palestinian armed presence in south Lebanon was short lived as in little time the Israelis and their proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army, soon became unwanted occupiers. Israel's occupation of the south eventually led to the creation of Hezbollah, the Shiite political, military and social organization established with Iranian financial, technical and military assistance. And at times supported and egged on by Syria.

After a protracted guerrilla campaign of harassment by Hezbollah, Israel finally withdrew from south Lebanon in 2000, giving the Shiite militia a major victory. Hezbollah continued its pressure on Israeli troops still occupying a segment of land known as the Shebaa Farms, situated at the juncture where the borders of Syria, Lebanon and Israel converge. And when the Shiite militia abducted two Israeli soldiers, Israel retaliated in the summer of 2006 with a massive bombardment of south Lebanon and the Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut's southern suburbs. And more blood flowed under the bridges, most of which were destroyed by Israel during the 32-day war.

While perhaps somewhat long-winded as a scene setter, the above narrative is nevertheless needed to clarify why Lebanon now finds itself likely to be the last Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Certainly not before Syria -- the last "front-line" state to remain in a state of war with Israel -- makes peace. (Opening a brief parenthesis, Lebanon did sign a treaty at the behest of the United States in 1983, which was later abrogated under Syrian pressure).

Which brings us to the present -- and the future. Damascus has recently been flirting with the notion of finalizing a peace treaty with Israel, hoping to recuperate the Golan Heights captured by Israel in 1967, in exchange for peace. If (and when) the Syrians finalize peace with Israel, it will for all intents and purposes bring the Arab-Israeli conflict to a close. (The Palestinian-Israeli dispute is another matter.) The other two front-line states, Egypt and Jordan have already recognized Israel and exchanged diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.

That would leave Lebanon standing apart as the only border Arab country technically still at war with Israel. Back in the early 1960s the consequences of that would have been insignificant. But this is 2008, and unless Lebanon is included in Syria's peace initiative more blood will likely flow in the future.

Why? Because given the fractured nature of Lebanese politics, a peace deal between Lebanon and Israel without Syria's support and blessing will not be worth the paper it is written on.

And finally, any peace deal between Syria and Israel that excludes Lebanon leaves a very dangerous escape clause in the agreement. The presence of armed militias in Lebanon leaves a risk that third parties could incite violence to advance their own agendas, the outcome of which would upset the entire peace process.