Precisely what Russians mean by "multipolarity," though, is a bit unclear. I have the distinct impression that they would be willing to settle for a return to Russian-American bipolarity, but Washington isn't interested in this. Russians sometimes seem a bit uncertain as to whether Russia is now once again a great power, but they are completely certain that it should be, can be, and will be one in the very near future, if not at present.

Furthermore, Putin & Co. have implemented a strategy for reviving Russia as a great power – one that is based on his a geoeconomic vision. As everyone knows, Russia is rich in petroleum and other natural resources. The Soviet regime, however, did not just exploit these resources inefficiently, but wasted them – hence undermining Moscow's superpower status that had been built up at such enormous cost, under Stalin in particular.

The form of capitalism that emerged under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, though, principally benefited the oligarchs who were able to turn what had been state property into their own private property – a process that benefited neither most of the Russian population nor the Russian government.

Putin, by contrast, sought to implement a strategy for restoring Russia as a great power articulated in his doctoral dissertation: state-controlled, not private, enterprises should exploit Russia's natural resources in order to ensure that the state benefits from this. But unlike in the Soviet era, these state-controlled enterprises should be capable of operating successfully in the world market. The profits from these state-controlled natural resource producers can then be directed by the Kremlin to develop other sectors of the economy.

The second part of this strategy (the development of other sectors of the economy besides natural resources) has yet to be implemented. But the first part – taking back under state control the natural resource sector by state-sponsored firms capable of operating successfully in the world market – has succeeded tremendously. Gazprom and Rosneft – the Russian state controlled gas and oil firms, respectively – have become two of the world's most powerful corporations. There are many other such Russian firms as well. Not only have these firms done well in exporting Russian natural resources abroad, but also in investing in projects elsewhere and even acquiring substantial influence in or control over foreign firms.

And this observation leads me to reflect on an inherent duality or contradiction (as the communists were fond of saying) in how Putin, the Russian elite, and the Russian public generally, view globalization. Moscow is extremely wary of globalization when it comes to foreign multinational corporations investing in Russia. Even when Moscow has allowed this, it has never felt the least compunction about changing the terms upon which foreign firms operate in Russia after they have invested there – in Moscow's favor, of course. On the other hand, Moscow vociferously defends the "right" of Russian firms to invest in other countries, and for their investments to be protected by foreign governments and courts.

This, of course, has not led to Russia to being viewed positively in other countries since it appears that what Moscow wants is to prevent foreign companies from controlling anything of value in Russia while at the same time pushing for Russian firms to be allowed to make other countries dependent on Russia, especially in the energy sphere.

This, arguably, is what Russia does indeed want in many countries, especially neighboring former Soviet ones. In others, though, this view might be exaggerated. In Western Europe, for example, many believe that Russia is seeking to form a gas cartel with Algeria and others in order to gouge West European consumers as well as make it too costly for them to be at odds with Russia. Russian gas cut-offs to Ukraine and Belarus, though brief, have fed this idea. In truth, though, what Moscow seems to want from Algeria and other gas producers more than anything is for them not to strenuously compete with Russia in the European market or take market share away from Russia.

Poor American relations with several Middle Eastern governments have been seized upon by Russian firms to sign contracts that they might not have gotten if they had to compete with American ones for them – especially in Iran. Indeed, there is great fear in Moscow that if an Iranian-American rapprochement ever occurs, Iran will prefer American and other Western firms as investment partners over Russian ones. While an Iranian-American rapprochement may not seem imminent either in Washington or Tehran, the fear of it serves to motivate Russian firms to sign as many contracts as they can, while they can, with Iran.

Russian firms, though, also have growing investments in Middle Eastern countries with pro-American governments, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and Libya (whose leader, Moammar Gadhafi, now gets along relatively well with the U.S. George W. Bush administration). These investments are not part of a Russian attempt to lure these governments away from Washington and into an alliance with Moscow. Indeed, there is a sense in Moscow that American security ties to these countries serves to protect Russian investments in them. Even for Russia, then, American hegemony can be useful sometimes.

In some countries, then, Moscow may have to choose between its geopolitical goal of weakening American influence on the one hand and pursuing Russian economic interests on the other. For these two goals will not always be mutually compatible.

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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.