A senior U.S. State Department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that Washington holds "a mixed picture" of Iranian policy in Iraq that ranges between providing weapons to Iraqi insurgents and helping to broker a ceasefire in Basra.

"You do not know exactly what game they are playing," he asserted.

The source elaborates how Iranians had contacts with Iraqi parliamentarians and politicians "to avoid a bloodbath" in Basra and argued that it is in the interest of Iran to have a stable post-SOFA Iraq.

"No, we are not counting on Iran to pass the SOFA, we are counting on our ability with our Iraqi partners to come up with an agreement that will work," affirmed the U.S. official, who made sure to add that "nobody has closed the door" on negotiations with Iran.

The day this administration took a decision to empower the ruling Shiite coalition, it subsequently consented to some sort of power sharing with Iran.

The mere arrival of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to office in May 2006 meant the United States gave the nod to a less controversial Iranian role in Iraqi political life.

Not surprisingly the first official visit of the premier was to neighboring Tehran where Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei praised the new Iraqi government, followed by Iraqi President Jalal Talibani in November 2006.

The Islamic Dawa Party, led by Maliki as secretary general, has enjoyed close relations with Iran since the 1980s and this would remain even if and when a nationalist government in Iraq finds itself in contradiction with Iranian influence.

But the steady and slow crumbling of the Shiite ruling coalition seems more in the interests of the United States which now can claim inroads in this alliance that, since 2006, seemed to work more in favor of Iran.

Maliki is now prisoner of his own surroundings, which are reflecting anti-U.S. concerns over SOFA, making the relationship of the Iraqi premier uncomfortable with Washington.

Maliki said on June 12 that negotiations over SOFA are deadlocked because of concerns over possible infringement of Iraqi sovereignty and an incident in Karbala last Friday in which U.S. soldiers killed a relative of Maliki after handing security to Iraqi forces in the area.

While Maliki and Kurdish leaders have some differences over SOFA and an oil revenues sharing law, Maliki is seeking support from the Tawafuq Front, the leading Sunni party, to rejoin the government and strengthen his coalition, as Arab neighboring countries are leaning toward more interaction with the Iraqi government.

However, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) Shia political party in Iraq seeks to push its decentralized vision of the country. Since Maliki is now at odds with Moqtada Sadr and Kurdish leaders, there is fear he could fall back to sectarian attitudes if felt isolated.

Sadr, who publicly went to Iran in June 2003 and January 2006, is maintaining a low profile, a move Washington considers "a wise choice not to contest or resist." Sadr himself seems dissatisfied with Iranian support for his movement since clashes erupted in Basra, but it is too soon to write an obituary for his stronghold political base.

Many argue that the Iraqi political scene could shift come the fall local elections when new Shiite forces could emerge as alternative political brands. But no drastic transformation of the political map is likely to occur even though there is a tangible rise in Iraqi nationalism with less sectarian tendencies.