As an article in the May 10 issue of The Economist ("Whose Side Are They All On?") pointed out, Iran competes with the U.S. in supporting the Shiite-dominated government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. But Tehran also supports Maliki's primary Shiite opponent – Mahdi Army leader Moqtada Sadr. And Tehran appears to be supporting radical "special groups" within the Mahdi Army which have ignored Sadr's calls for them to stop fighting.

Why is Iran doing this? It seems to me that there are three possible explanations. The first is that Tehran does not know what it wants, or perhaps more precisely, does not know what is going to happen in Iraq. Tehran clearly prefers that Iraq be ruled by fellow Shiites who would presumably be friendlier to Iran than Sunnis who are hostile toward it. But since the Iraqi Shiites are divided, Tehran is supporting them all since it cannot foretell who will come out on top.

The second explanation is that different political factions inside Iran are supporting different groups inside Iraq. Their doing so is actually more related to the internal political struggle inside Iran than the politico-military one inside Iraq.

The third explanation is that the Iranians are deliberately supporting different Iraqi Shiite groups because Tehran wants to keep them all weak and divided. And Tehran is doing this because it fears that the more united Iraqi Shiites become, the less dependant on Iran and amenable to its interests they will be. The fact that the various Iraqi Shiite groups have proven difficult for Tehran to manage up to now when they have been weak and divided – and presumably more in need of support – suggests that such an Iranian fear may be well justified.

Which of these is the correct explanation for why Tehran supports different Iraqi Shiite groups that oppose one another? Or is there another explanation altogether? I, for one, do not know. More importantly, the various Iraqi Shiite groups which Iran is supporting probably do not know either. It is highly likely, though, that each of them deeply resents Tehran for supporting its opponents. But probably none of them dares complain too loudly about this for fear that Iran might reduce, suspend, or even end support for it.

What this suggests is that the various Iraqi Shiite groups may well resent Iran even while they receive support from it. This, of course, allows the United States an opportunity for attempting to achieve a modus vivendi among them (and between them and the Iraqi Sunnis now working with the United States) that would allow the Iraqi Shiite groups to be less dependent on Iran.

The United States, though, needs to be realistic about what reaching out to the contending Iraqi Shiite groups can accomplish. While Washington would like them all to move away from Tehran, these groups will attempt to obtain whatever form of assistance they can get from both America and Iran.

This, however, would be better for the United States than having Iraqi Shiite groups which rely solely or principally on Iran. Just being taken seriously in any American-sponsored political reconciliation process despite poor relations with the U.S. previously could allow Iraqi Shiite groups already annoyed with Iran the space they need to start moving away from it. And that would be no small accomplishment.

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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.