It is official, the "axis of evil" and the "absolute evil" are now separately wandering the streets of the Turkish capital, Ankara, and are poised to meet face to face at some point.

The two truculent adversaries are the first to capture the new momentum in the region, the fading role of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs David Welch walked a fine line yesterday in not conveying complete displeasure over Syrian-Israeli appeasement while staying firm about Washington's perception of Damascus. Lebanon seems to remain the only place where U.S. and Israeli interests simply diverge.

Welch, who knows how to coin catch words, said that his administration does not object to Israel's intent to "expand the circle of peace" but indirectly implied that his administration tried to convince the Israeli government not to go down that road.

Washington is recently striving to avoid giving the impression of a spoiler. Whether on the Doha agreement about Lebanon or the Syrian-Israeli track, U.S. officials want to watch from the bench and escape the blame at the end.

Unlike the last round of negotiations between Syria and Israel in 2000, this time seems not about the narrow strip of land along the Sea of Galilee. It is more about strategic choices.

Olmert is ever weaker, yet still resilient. Cornered by scandals and aspiring premiers, he is searching for an exit strategy.

Olmert becomes much more vulnerable in his relations with the United States, the more he walks out from discussions with the Palestinian Authority and get closer to talks with Damascus.

A poll conducted yesterday indicated that two-thirds of Israelis oppose giving up the Golan Heights to make peace with Syria, a margin even higher than those who object to dividing Jerusalem with Palestinians.

More than 25,000 Israeli settlers and some 17,000 Syrian Druze inhabit the Golan Heights; an area that lost its strategic value and became a market for wine and tourism. Damascus is reported to have already started business plans for the area once it is restored.

But as late as Wednesday, the Israeli army conducted a live-fire exercise on the outskirts of Katzrin, on the Heights, in a sign by the security establishment that negotiations go parallel with military readiness.

Israel wants to change the geopolitics of the region after its summer war on Lebanon in 2006.

Olmert wants to weaken Hezbollah and Hamas from the Syrian gateway, or at least put Damascus at odds with those two militant groups and with Iran.

This has become more evident since Israel is now certain it cannot rely on Lebanon's pro-Western March 14 forces and their ability to counter Hezbollah.

It is also worth noting that the three sides involved in the process did not leak the news from Ankara until Lebanese leaders reached a deal in Doha.

One could argue that they did not want this to influence the unfolding outcome in Qatar. If they had done so, March 14 forces may have felt the heat or the opposition might have been more convinced about the shift of balance in the region, with Hezbollah more concerned about the Syrian venture.

For Syria, the endpoint of this negotiation game is to be on good terms with the United States, and to lay this ground months before a new administration comes to the White House.

Isolated on the Arab and international scene, Syria wants to reinvent itself as relevant to Arab affairs and reclaim its stability label in the Middle East. It wants to put to rest any political damage inflicted on it by the special tribunal over Lebanon Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri's assassination and to ensure its return to normalcy in international relations.

However, this negotiation journey seems improbable for many reasons. It is unlikely that Syria would break away from its strategic partnership with Iran unless a high and sustained price is given in return.

With Washington's gentle reservation on this track and the near-end term of the U.S. administration, no one has the capacity to deliver this price.

Meanwhile, it is a good distraction game for a troubled Olmert, an ideal public relations effort for the solitary Syrian President Bashar Assad, and a prompt national utility for Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose ruling party might be out within months.

But perhaps somewhere beneath the circumstantial skepticism surrounding this track, those three leaders could reach the unthinkable with their backs to the wall.