Ideally, this would mean substantially diminishing the global usage and demand for heroin, a step that some Afghan and Pakistani government officials claim is the primary problem.

Demand reduction is important, but under the best of circumstances, will take decades to accomplish.

(This is the last of an eight-part series.)

To have a more immediate impact requires a concentrated effort to eradicate opium, destroy heroin labs, seize shipments of drugs and precursor chemicals, and arrest and extradite the top narcotics traffickers, taking away all of their money and assets in the process. Successfully eradicating narcotics trafficking will eliminate the Taliban's primary source of income.

The single most important issue to eradicating opium is security. The Taliban must be defeated and destroyed, not merely driven into other provinces where they will regroup. In order to decisively defeat them within a reasonable period of time, there needs to be a considerable increase in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by NATO. Otherwise, it is just going to be a perpetual stalemate, and in this case, the Taliban wins the ties.

Almost 80 percent of Afghanistan's opium cultivation takes place in five Taliban infested provinces that lack governance. Every suggestion made in this and previous articles in this series regarding corruption, eradication, and income generating programs are useful in secure areas, but meaningless in Taliban controlled provinces unless security is achieved first.

Providing governors and warlords with cash payments and other incentives for eradicating opium and overseeing alternative crop programs are good ideas, but the program should include bonuses for the destruction of heroin laboratories and the seizure of drugs and precursor chemicals transiting their regions. There should also be penalties if they fail to act on these critical issues.

Paktya and Balkh are just two of the provinces that have become opium free, yet remain primary conduits for drugs and precursor chemicals.

The integrity of a province should be judged by several measurable criteria, not solely upon the capacity to persuade farmers to quit growing opium, because the farmers are the weakest and most vulnerable link in the drug chain.

One way to counter opium cultivation is to destroy the internal market for it. This means taking out the traffickers and the labs.

Creating a well-publicized program of lucrative rewards or bounties for the capture of mid- to top-level drug traffickers could disrupt their operations and push some of them into hiding. It would make them viable targets for anyone in need of cash, which in Afghanistan, includes just about everyone.

Additional rewards should be offered for information leading to the seizure or destruction of heroin labs, precursor chemicals, opium warehouses, and drug shipments.

Taking out heroin processing labs will help curtail the market for opium. Last year, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan destroyed several hundred heroin labs, but a laboratory is just a heating source, a tub, and a few barrels of chemicals. The problem is that there are still countless small labs operating in Afghanistan.

Several narcotics analysts have said that military and police operations should work together to destroy labs and that if a ground operation is impractical, due to terrain or security issues, then air or missile strikes should be used to destroy the labs.

ISAF does not want to get involved in opium eradication or the drug war for fear of alienating Afghan civilians. But the insurgency is funded by narcotics. Eliminating heroin labs, precursor chemicals, and drugs is a preventive measure that diminishes the capacity of the Taliban to fund their operations and pay for soldiers, weapons, and supplies.

Afghanistan and other states stricken by drugs can strike back at traffickers by arresting and extraditing their top leaders to the United States or other countries where the drug kingpin's power and influence are negated. Criminals around the world fear extradition, and it's an essential tool in breaking up drug networks and criminal organizations.

Another effective tool to counter drug traffickers is participation in multinational counter-narcotics conferences and organizations. One such program is Operation Containment, initiated by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration to facilitate regional cooperation and information among 19 countries impacted by the Afghan drug trade.

In addition to disrupting distribution networks and money laundering operations, it's designed to seize precursor chemicals and drug shipments. This program has taken down a number of high-level drug traffickers.

Narcotics trafficking and the insurgency feed off of each other. It is impossible to address or defeat one, without containing the other. It would be beneficial if military, police, governance, reconstruction, and humanitarian efforts worked together within a flexible grid to address the respective needs at provincial and district level.

There is no set formula for success. Each province must be analyzed individually to assess security issues and humanitarian concerns so that the proper blend of resources can be allocated to ensure the long term objectives of stability and governance.

The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime's "Winter Afghan Opium Report," which came out in February, notes that a massive quantity of opium is being stockpiled for future sales. Even if the entire 2008 Afghan opium crop is eradicated, heroin labs will remain busy unless opium warehouses are located and destroyed.

To address the multifaceted role that opium cultivation plays within individual households and communities requires a comprehensive understanding of Afghan culture, economy, history, and mindset.

It also requires a long-term commitment from the highest levels of regional and international governmental and nongovernmental agencies to address the economic and political realities the government of Afghanistan is dealing with.

Realistically, it is going to take many years to eradicate drugs and change the opium-based economy under the current environment. Some of the concerns are being addressed, but the key to everything is security. Al-Qaida is an annoyance, but it's the Taliban who are the real threat to Afghanistan and the region.

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EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the final installment of an eight-part series. We will, however be publishing additional reports by the same author.

Professor James Emery is an anthropologist and journalist who has reported on regional conflicts and the drug trade for over 20 years, including five years overseas. He's made several trips into Afghanistan, Myanmar, and other drug-producing and transit countries. Professor Emery lectures on Afghan and Arab culture and the use of applied anthropology in the occupation of Afghanistan, global terrorism, and the war on drugs.

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This is the last of eight articles.

See part one at Afghanistan's opium dilemma

See part two at The Taliban opium connection

See part three at Afghan opium – The farmer's perspective

See part four at Afghan drugs and regional addiction rates

See part five at Afghanistan's myriad drug smuggling routes

See part six at Converting Afghan opium into heroin

See part seven at Winning the Afghan opium war