None of the precursors are manufactured in Afghanistan. In all, some 11,000 tons of chemicals were required to process opium in Afghanistan during 2007.
(This is part six of an eight-part series.)
The chemicals are smuggled into Afghanistan from China, India, Pakistan, and the Central Asian Republics. Sometimes they're labeled as cleaning solutions or industrial chemicals, but most of the time they're simply trucked into Afghanistan without inspection or detection on either side of the border. There have been no significant seizures of precursor chemicals in any of the countries bordering Afghanistan since 2001. The lack of seizures during the last two years, when record levels of Afghan opium and heroin were being produced, is especially troubling.
"Over 1,000 tons of acetic anhydride is needed to process all of this opium into heroin," said Hakan Demirbuken, regional monitoring expert with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). "Last year more than 90 percent of the precursor seizures were at the eastern part of Afghanistan in the provinces of Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktya near the Pakistan border." There are virtually no seizures across the border, in spite of the fact that the majority of precursor chemicals arrive by way of Pakistan.
"Precursor chemicals are another area where we see there must be the involvement of organized criminal groups," said Andrea Mancini, an Afghan specialist with the UNODC. "They are the same as the anti-government elements or at least are working with them, especially in the south and along the border." The Taliban, having aligned and identified themselves with all aspects of the drug trade, are providing protection and assistance to criminal groups smuggling precursor chemicals into Afghanistan and drugs out of it.
Most of the processing labs are located in southern Afghanistan, close to opium sources and under the protection of the Taliban. Smaller refineries, including numerous mobile labs, are scattered around other parts of the country, with many located near border areas for easy transit of the refined heroin. Most small labs consist of little more than a heating device, raw opium, and a few drums of chemicals.
The main opium markets in Helmand province are in Musa Quala and Sangin. Musa Quala district is in northern Helmand province and has seen heavy fighting this year. Sangin district is directly southeast. Each of the two districts has numerous heroin labs. "The Taliban provide security for the labs," said Demirbuken. "There are a lot of heroin labs in southern Afghanistan in Helmand province, Nimroz province, and Uruzgan province controlled by Taliban people. They are very powerful."
Prior to the arrival of the Taliban in 1996, there were considerably more processing labs located in Pakistan's tribal areas, but most of them moved into Afghanistan, where they could operate openly under the protection of the Taliban. Increased interdiction efforts by Afghan authorities the last few years have driven some Afghan heroin labs back into Baluchistan, on the Pakistani side of the border.
You simply can't make heroin without precursor chemicals and the fact that over 1,300 tons of acetic anhydride was delivered into Afghanistan during the last year by phantom truck lines that nobody saw is unacceptable. The recently established Precursor Control Unit within the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan should be expanded to form a Regional Precursor Task Force to look into all aspects of this issue, beginning with the manufacturers in China and India who appear to be supplying most of the precursors used in Afghanistan.
Plausible deniability and shoddy recordkeeping only goes so far. It does not excuse the fact that these manufactures are well aware of what is boosting the sudden demand for their chemicals. The United States should insist on support from the governments of China and India in precursor investigations that will curtail production levels to exclude chemicals destined for Afghanistan. A review of the invoices may disclose some information regarding buyers and transporters of these chemicals, but most of the records will be fraudulent or destroyed.
"Certainly blocking the import into Afghanistan of precursor chemicals will choke the trafficking of heroin and morphine," said Mr. Antonio Maria Costa, the executive director of the UNODC. "About 15 years ago Afghanistan was exporting about 75 percent of its opium; the other 25 percent was refined [to morphine or heroin]. Now it's the other way around. They export about two-thirds as heroin and morphine and only one-third as raw opium." Afghan criminal groups are processing opium at about almost three times the rate of 1992, increasing profits through value-added efforts in exporting refined product.
Globally, heroin is often categorized by grades. A kilogram of number 4 grade heroin is significantly purer and more expensive. It is usually injected. A kilogram of number 3 grade heroin is less pure and costs less. It is typically smoked or burned with the addict inhaling the vapors. In Afghanistan, you don't hear about heroin grades, you have white heroin and brown heroin. The white heroin, which requires additional processing, is more pure and more expensive.
Most of the heroin coming out of Afghanistan is brown heroin. It's being cut by Afghan and Pakistani traffickers at somewhat inconsistent levels, affecting the purity and value of the product, but appears to be running at 50 percent to 60 percent purity.
Crystal heroin or crack heroin are new terms being used in Afghanistan and Iran for the high quality heroin being produced in the region. It's probably white heroin, what would be called number 4 grade in the West, which is typically 85 percent to 95 percent pure. A few reports put the white Afghan heroin at 70 percent to 80 percent purity, but this may simply be a guesstimate as a significant sampling has not yet been analyzed.
Pakistan's chemical control program is not working. Joint Western and Pakistani military and police operations using a combination of random maneuvers, human and scientific intelligence, and lucrative incentives for informers, could be put into place to apprehend or destroy caravans of precursor chemicals transiting Pakistan. Every truckload of precursors captured or destroyed is less money and fewer weapons being funneled into Taliban coffers and armories.
--
Professor James Emery is an anthropologist and journalist who has reported on regional conflicts and the drug trade for more than 20 years, including five years overseas. He's made several trips into Afghanistan, Myanmar, and other drug-producing and transit countries.
--
This is the sixth of eight articles.
See part one at Afghanistan's opium dilemma
See part two at The Taliban opium connection
See part three at Afghan opium – The farmer's perspective
See part four at Afghan drugs and regional addiction rates
See part five at Afghanistan's myriad drug smuggling routes
See part seven at Winning the Afghan opium war
See part eight at Delivering the fatal blow to Afghan opium