The "track II" talks, meaning that negotiations are carried out by either lower-echelon diplomats, or in most cases by former diplomats or people who have the trust of the leadership they represent, had established a working protocol, according to Alon Liel, a former director general of Israel's Foreign Ministry.

The talks went on for almost two years until Israel called them off under strong pressure from the U.S. administration of George W. Bush not to negotiate with Damascus, according to Liel.

In a meeting in Washington, Wednesday, the former Israeli official related how the Bush White House applied pressure on Israel to call off the talks.

The tract II negotiations, in this particular case involved Liel, who had by then left the Israeli Foreign Ministry, and Ibrahim Suleiman a Syrian businessman who had the trust of the regime. The talks centered on the possibility of turning part of the Golan Heights into a "national park" which would be accessible to both Syrians and Israelis.

Political analysts, particularly those who follow Middle East affairs on a regular basis, are quasi-unanimous in believing there can never be a viable or lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians before a peace treaty is agreed to between Syria and Israel.

The reason for this is quite simple: Syria wants to reclaim the Golan Heights occupied by Israel in the June 5, 1967 war. Syrian leaders fear that once the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is settled, the United States and the Europeans are likely to lose interest in the Middle East. Having spent enormous amounts of energy, resources and capital to bring about the creation of a Palestinian state, and an end to the core issue of the Middle East conflict, the Syrians worry – and rightfully so – that the West will lose interest and move on.

For that purpose Damascus will do everything in its power to prevent a resolution of the Palestinian problem in which the return of the Golan Heights is not addressed.

Syria has the means to carry out its threats, and without implicating itself directly. Damascus commands enough forces in the region to torpedo any potential peace deal where it is not included. Within the arsenal available to the Syrian high command is Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite movement, whose militia is in fact equipped more along the lines of a regular army. Hezbollah is supported and financed by Iran, currently Syria's closest ally.

Additionally, Syria can call upon several thousands of loyalists composed of Baathists, Palestinian groups based in Damascus – such as Ahmad Gibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and an unknown number of intelligence officers left behind in Lebanon when Damascus was forced to pull out its military following the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, a murder which was blamed on Syria. And finally, one must not forget that Hamas – the Islamic Resistance Movement fighting in the Palestinian territories – has its leadership based in the Syrian capital.

The Israelis understood the importance of a deal with Syria, but as Liel explained, "Israel was afraid of upsetting the Americans." However, what is beyond comprehension is not just the Bush administration's blatant refusal to talk to Damascus, but even more perplexing is the fact that the administration strongly discouraged Israelis to engage in diplomatic negotiations with the Syrian regime. Even in track II negotiations.

The secret talks had succeeded in establishing a set of informal, unofficial agreements for peace accords between the two longtime enemies, according to the former Israeli Foreign Ministry official.

Among the key elements of the Israeli-Syrian peace treaty was an agreement of principles to be signed between the two countries, which upon its fulfillment, a lasting peace treaty would be signed.

Those included:

- Withdrawal by Israel from the Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967. The timetable for this remained debatable. Syria wanted the pull out over a five-year period; Israel demanded it be over 15 years.

- A buffer zone would be set up along the Sea of Galilee, where a park would be established for use by both Israelis and Syrians.

- Israel would retain control over the use of the waters of the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee.

- The zone along the border would be demilitarized on a ratio of 1:4, in Israel's favor.

- According to the terms of the agreement Syria would also accept to end its support of Hezbollah and Hamas and distance itself from Iran.

Alas, none of this is likely to happen, first because of the Bush administration's insistence that Israel not engage in talks with Syria; and secondly because, "Only through the leadership of the United States can Israel and Syria end their conflict," as states the Israel Syria Peace Society.

Not only can the United States help bring about a peaceful solution between Israel and Syria, but peace with Syria would in turn help resolve the Lebanese crisis. That would have a positive impact in easing tension along Israel's northern border (assuming Hezbollah gives up its weapons once the dispute over contested real estate in south Lebanon is resolved) making the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute that much easier to negotiate.

Interestingly, according to Liel, throughout the talks Syria kept asking that Washington be present. When asked by the Israelis why it was so important to have U.S. participation, the Syrians replied, "If we leave Iran, we need the United States."