Just like his predecessors in the Kremlin stretching back to Nikita Khrushchev, Putin has assiduously pursued good relations with Arab governments. Putin himself has paid visits to Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. He also visited Israel's nemesis, Iran, just this past October.
Putin, though, has also pursued good relations with Israel. This is very different from his predecessors who were either antagonistic toward it or lukewarm at best. Although reviled in much of the world, Putin had a close relationship with former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (who spoke Russian fluently). And although Russian-Israeli relations deteriorated after Putin sold sophisticated missiles to Syria, the Russian-Israeli relationship remains strong. Trade between them is flourishing, and there is even security cooperation between the two countries. Shortly after his recent trip to Tehran, Putin received Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in the Kremlin.
One Israeli diplomat I spoke to in Washington indicated that Putin's concern for the Jewish state – and the many Russian speakers living in it – appears quite genuine. At a time of rising xenophobia in Russia, Putin has also gone out of his way to denounce anti-Semitism. His sympathy for Jews has been traced back to close relationships he formed with several of them during his childhood in what was then Leningrad.
Putin, though, is definitely an outlier in this regard. As that same diplomat also told me, while Israeli officials have been warmly received by him, their reception by others in Moscow has been distinctly colder. Although there are a surprising number of Russian journalists who are sympathetic toward Israel, the bulk of the foreign policy, defense, and security service establishments have a strong preference for the anti-American regimes of the Middle East. They also see moderate Arab disapproval of American support for Israel as an opportunity for Moscow to improve ties with traditionally pro-American regimes.
In addition, there is a strong domestic political imperative for Moscow to favor the Arabs over Israel: Russia's Jewish population is only a few hundred thousand whereas its Muslim population numbers close to 15 million – over a tenth of the country's population.
In other words: Without Putin, Moscow would probably not have the close relationship with Israel that it has had under his leadership. So if Moscow downgrades its ties to Israel after he steps down from the presidency, this will be a sign that Putin's influence is waning.
Indeed, if a power struggle between Putin and Medvedev does emerge, one way for the latter to curry favor with the security services would be for him to promote the more pro-Arab and anti-Israeli foreign policy that they prefer.
But would Medvedev challenge Putin like this? It is possible, but does not seem likely. Medvedev's statements so far indicate that, if anything, he will pursue a more pro-Western policy than Putin. And worse relations with Israel would not promote improved relations with the United States.
If Russian relations with Israel do deteriorate after Putin steps down from the presidency, then, it may not be because he is becoming weaker vis-à-vis Medvedev, but that both of them are becoming weaker vis-à-vis the security services – who would also oppose the more pro-Western policy that Medvedev appears to be advocating at present.
On the other hand, if Russian-Israeli relations remain at the same level as now after Medvedev becomes president, this will be a strong indication that Putin remains fully in charge of Russian foreign policy.
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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.