This reminds me of an experience I had almost 20 years ago, in February-March 1988, when the U.S. Information Agency (an arm of the U.S. government that no longer exists) sent me on a speaking tour to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and North Yemen in order to talk about Soviet foreign policy. The message I attempted to convey was that the Soviets were trying very hard to increase their influence in the region, but that they faced many obstacles.

Several of the American officials I met in the region were not so sure about the second part of my message. At the time, it seemed to them that the Soviets were encountering no obstacles at all. Moscow had recently signed an agreement with Kuwait to protect some of its oil shipping -- the first time the USSR had been asked to play an active role in the defense of any of the conservative Gulf monarchies, traditionally allied to the West. Moscow had also expanded its ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia and other states while retaining its alliances with Iraq and South Yemen. In addition, Gorbachev had launched diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Iraq-Iran war and the Arab-Israeli conflict, which were being taken seriously by the countries of the region. In short, Moscow seemed to be improving its ties with all states in the region at the same time that Washington's relations with them had deteriorated badly -- much like today.

I spoke to a variety of groups during that trip back in 1988: foreign ministry officials, newspaper editors, university professors, and other audiences invited to hear me speak at various U.S. embassies and consulates. On each occasion, the moment I finished my talk on Moscow and the Gulf, the Arabs in the audience would begin asking questions or making speeches about Washington and the Arab/Israeli situation.

When this happened, I would say to the audience, "American policy toward the Arab/Israeli conflict is highly important. But so is Moscow's policy toward this area. Don't you have any questions about that?" Except on one occasion, no one ever did. I was mystified -- until I reached the last country on my speaking tour, North Yemen.

Once again, I gave my talk on Moscow and the Gulf and afterward was bombarded with questions and statements about American policy toward Israel and the Palestinians. Once again, I asked them whether they were completely uninterested in Moscow's policy toward their region. One of the Yemeni politicians present responded, "You Americans are worried about the spread of Moscow's influence, but we Arabs are not. We know their weapons are not as good as yours. We know they offer nothing in terms of economic assistance. We know that their ideology and culture are unattractive to us.

"You Americans think that Moscow has great influence in the Arab world. The Russians themselves also think so. But we Arabs know that they don't.

"So, to answer your question, we aren't much interested in Moscow's policy in this region. I know you have spent years studying this question, but quite frankly you have wasted your time. One day, you will see."

At the time, I thought this Yemeni politician spoke utter nonsense. So did the American embassy officials accompanying me. But his assessment about Russia's relative lack of importance in the region soon proved to be accurate. And I suspect that it will remain so, despite Putin's best efforts and those in the West who fear them.

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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University. During January 2008, he is in residence as a scholar at the Kennan Institute in Washington, D.C.