Well-informed sources have told the Middle East Times that these rogue elements of the Pakistani military support the jihadis and share their extremist views of an ultra-conservative form of Islam.

One former CIA official told a Middle East Times source that, "It's worrying when half of your lower or mid-level Pak intelligence analysts have Bin Laden screen-savers on their computers."

The conclusion of a number of U.S. analysts is that al-Qaida and other jihadis have successfully penetrated the armed forces and security services in Pakistan. If these findings are substantiated it could be a matter of grave concern, given the fact that Pakistan is in possession of nuclear weapons.

Should the radical elements of Pakistan's military ever succeed in overthrowing the current regime and taking over the country, it would radically alter the geo-political map of the region -- and not for the better, either. A nuclear-armed Pakistan run by pro-bin Laden sympathizers would likely initiate a climate of high tension not only with neighboring India, but could extend towards the already volatile Middle East.

Backing up their theory that pro-extremists found sympathy and support among influential people in the Pakistani security forces, the sources cited the example of Rashi Rauf, the prime suspect in a recent plot to blow up 10 U.S. passenger airplanes in the United Kingdom last year. Rauf escaped last week while being taken from court in Rawalpindi. The prime suspects are the security personnel, who some believe, have facilitated Rauf's escape, the sources said.

Of the seven or eight attempts to assassinate President Pervez Musharraf, two took place in December 2003 when rockets were fired at his vehicle during a visit to Rawalpindi, the same city where Bhutto was killed on Thursday.

Then there was the attempt to fire on his plane with an anti-aircraft gun in early 2007. There were also two suicide attacks on the Army's General HQ and two attacks outside the offices of the ISI, after Pakistani security forces, on Musharraf's orders, assaulted the Red Mosque, the Lal Masjid, in Islamabad last July when Islamists retrenched inside the mosque with scores of hostages.

Following the two attacks on Musharraf, junior army and air force officers were arrested. The ensuing investigation discovered that they had ties with Jaish-e-Mohammad, an Islamist group. In the rocket attack, the son of an army brigadier general was arrested.

The source says, however, that only lower-ranking army officials were arrested and court-martialed. The investigations are dead in the water.

Bhutto's main fear, according to a well-placed source, was that Brig. Gen. (rtd) Ijaz Shah of the Pakistani IB would prove a grave threat to her. She was worried about security but did not make it a big issue until Dec. 26 when she complained that the electronic jammers used to neutralize IED's were faulty.

But one U.S. analyst familiar with the situation told the Middle East Times that Mrs. Bhutto was warned of security issues. "She was warned of the dangers yet she continued to behave in a way in which the Secret Service in the U.S. would never accept," said Thomas Houlahan, director of military assessment with the Center for Security and Science in Washington, D.C.

"She insisted on having her own people run her protection," said Houlahan, who added, "but nothing would protect her when she decided to stand through the sun roof of her car.

"That was extremely reckless," said Houlahan. "I don't see what could have been done."

Opposition to Benazir Bhutto was to be found not only in the country's army and air force from bin Laden sympathizers, but also from old Zia ul-Haq loyalists who did not want the daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a position of power.

"They especially loathed the idea that Bhutto had pledged the United States to allow U.S. intelligence to interrogate rogue atomic scientist A.Q. Khan and allow U.S. forces to hunt for bin Laden on Pakistani soil," said the source. "She did not have much of a chance."

The general view among many in the intelligence community is that Musharraf himself is a marked man and not likely to stay in power too long. The question is this: If the Islamists ever succeed in removing Musharraf, with Bhutto now gone, who would be likely to govern Pakistan and gain control of its nuclear arsenal?

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