To get a sense of what might happen, I ran a role playing game on revolution in my class at George Mason University with the current state of Pakistani politics as its starting point.

In addition to Musharraf and former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, students played the roles of the nine Pakistani generals, the nine Pakistani Islamist leaders, also Osama Bin Laden, Mullah Omar of the Taliban, the U.S./NATO backed government of Afghanistan, India, and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (the U.S., UK, France, Russia, and China).

Unlike most role playing games I have run which were free form, this one set out formulas which, if achieved, would allow different groups to "win:"

If Musharraf, Bhutto, and Sharif could all reach an agreement on how to do so, then democratization would occur and revolution would be forestalled.

Alternatively, if Musharraf could keep at least six of the nine generals loyal to him, then he could remain in power without the bother of democratization. Musharraf, though, would fall if: 1) six of the nine generals combined to overthrow him; 2) five Islamist leaders and four generals joined forces to overthrow him and declare Islamic rule; or 3) either Bhutto or Sharif could join forces with four generals to oust him and declare democracy (whether it would actually come about or not).

There was an obviously arbitrary element to each of these formulas, but they all reflect the reality that the Pakistani army is the arbiter of the political contest in that country: nobody else can keep or gain power without the cooperation of significant elements within it.

So what happened?

At the start of the game, I announced that the first to achieve any of these winning formulas would win - in other words, the game was something of a race. But during most of the game, nothing much happened. Musharraf, Bhutto, and Sharif couldn't come to an agreement. The generals remained loyal to Musharraf, and would not seize power from him. The generals rejected all overtures from the Islamists. And neither Bhutto nor Sharif made an agreement with some of the generals to take power.

But after over 45 minutes of stalemate - and with much cajoling from the American team - Musharraf, Bhutto, and Sharif finally did reach an agreement: Musharraf would remain president for three years, Bhutto and Sharif would battle it out in the elections with the winner becoming prime minister and the loser getting an important ministerial post. The game then ended.

In talking about the game afterward, though, it became clear that other options had been explored. Four of the generals were willing to seize power - but they did not have sufficient trust in the others to try to get the two more needed for a coup. The Islamists apparently did talk two generals into siding with them, but the same problem emerged for them in attempting to get any more. Bhutto and Sharif each made tentative approaches to various generals, but nothing came of these either.

The students playing Musharraf, Bhutto, and Sharif all indicated that part of the reason they finally came to an agreement was that the U.S. team was pressing them to do so. Bhutto and Sharif each cited the fear of American displeasure as the reason why neither of them strongly pursued the possibility of allying with some of the generals to seize power. The generals cited the same reason for not seizing power on their own.

What the outcome of the game suggested is that several of the principal actors in Pakistani politics - including Musharraf, Bhutto, Sharif, and most generals - want American and Western approval. None wants to be seen - or blamed - for derailing progress toward democracy since this would lead to American and Western disapproval, and to Washington supporting others against them.

What it also suggested is that even though Musharraf, Bhutto, and Sharif do not much like each other, they may come to realize that cooperating with one another is the best way for them all to survive and prevent the military from seizing power either by itself or with an opportunist political leader.

Would that the real Musharraf, Bhutto, and Sharif would come to this realization!

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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.