Violent incidents of all kinds are down 60 percent over the past six months, according to the U.S. commander in Iraq, Army Gen. David Petraeus. The dampening down of attacks means more flexibility in deploying his 160,000 troops. But it means something else as well: U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq are increasingly operating in a twilight world of wider and wider swings between eruptions of kinetic combat and the less adrenalin-driven routines of counter-insurgency tactics, mentoring and supporting the Iraqi Police and army to pass security responsibility to them, promoting local governance, and winning hearts and minds.

It is understandable, then, that the warning 'complacency kills,' is now the military mantra in Iraq, posted in every office, every briefing room, every mess hall, and repeated before every mission beyond the wire enclosures of every base.

In western Anbar province, where explosive devices, ambushes, and sniping has dropped from 75 a week to 24 in an area the size of South Carolina, U.S. military patrols are mainly "presence" and meet-and-greet operations that show that they are still very much around, and to help people gain a sense of added security.

They are coordinated with Iraqi Police, who are sometimes integrated into patrols, with IPs in the lead so ordinary Iraqis see their forces at work. Other patrol with Iraqi forces in tasks that fortify the benefits of non-violence and cooperation, such as taking away non-essential road barriers along thoroughfares and neighborhoods. At night, census activities are conducted by troops and IPs who knock on doors, identify and take information on residents, listen to their problems and, of course collect information on suspicious activities or persons. When warranted, late night/early morning detention raids are sprung to roll up terrorists and their suspected collaborators.

Combat engineers, meanwhile, continue to go out looking for possible improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, and reconstruct vital roads and bridges, while civil affairs units meet with city and town councils to pinpoint infrastructure and governance needs.

All this isn't to say that Iraq is not a very dangerous place. It is, but less so than before, which means an U.S. troops need to adjust their thinking. A sign on the wall in one command post accurately sums up the emotional tug U.S. forces now deal with: 'Be nice to every Iraqi you meet, but be ready to kill him if necessary.' In essence it's a best friend, worst enemy attitude of mind.

Troops in western Anbar still wear full body armor and lock and load their weapons without exception when leaving forward operating bases or the smaller, satellite encampments, no matter how quiet a town or area they're going to patrol, although many speak of the "night and day" changes in their environment.

The relative calm has been helped in by the much-argued tactic of engaging and reaching working accommodations with tribal sheiks, much as the British did during their protectorate period and the Turks during the Ottoman Empire. Saddam Hussein, too, was mindful to the importance of tribes and reportedly turned a blind eye to some of their ways.

Cooperating with the tribes has helped defeat or push al-Qaida out of many areas of the province, neutralize the influence of nationalist insurgents, and establish security conditions, so that Iraqis - long cowed into a weak and defensive attitude to avoid punishment to themselves and their families - can begin to rebuild their country.

Although IEDs are continuing to kill and maim Iraqi civilians and troops, a semblance of normality is being established. Yet Iraq is unable to measure up to the expectations of Western democracies.

Meanwhile, U.S. troops are suffering the mental and emotional stress of switching between the two postures of action, more so from their dismay that the United States and the rest of the world doesn't seem to know or appreciate what's being achieved.

Added to this is their uncertainty about the plans of the insurgents and terrorists: Are they biding their time for a Tet-like offensive that could thoroughly rattle even the strongest supporters of the war and push the United States into premature withdrawal? Will the alliances with tribal sheiks hold? Can friendly sheiks overcome decades-old rivalries to work together? Can Sunni sheiks reach out successfully to their Shiite counterparts? Can sheiks keep clans and sub-clans in line? And the big question: In which direction will the more volatile Shiite Muslim areas of the country go?