Georgia's miscalculation in the Caucasus which resulted in Russia pushing for regime change in Tbilisi is reviving the specter of the Cold War. Following a script that could have been written in Czechoslovakia in that fateful spring of 1968, or in Hungary in 1956, Russian troops are set to bring to order a neighboring republic – and a U.S. ally – that took its distance from Moscow somewhat too abruptly and its relationship with Washington too close to the liking of Russia's new tsars, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev.

The crisis in the Caucasus in having repercussions beyond the borders of the former Soviet empire, its impact on the Middle East is already being felt. Israel, which enjoys close relations with Georgia, has been training and supplying the Georgian armed forces. Israeli transport planes were the only aircraft flying into

Tbilisi as fighting raged to evacuate Georgian Jews to Israel.

There is a potential danger of countries in the Arab world to take Russia's re-entry into the global political scene as a major power broker as a signal to openly side with Moscow, as Cold War II gets underway.

Indeed, there are multiple reasons for Arab countries to fly to the support of a former ally and supporter of multiple revolutions and revolutionaries in the Middle East.

First, there is the knee-jerk desire by some in the Arab world to "stick it to the United States," for its unilateralist policy of these last eight years.

Second, there is the impulsive reaction by others that if Israel (and the United States) is backing Georgia, then they should be backing the "enemy of my enemy."

Third, there are those countries with historic ties to the Russians, whom the United States has largely shunned these last eight years (such as Syria) who might be more than tempted to point out to Washington how mistaken that policy was.

And there are other reasons, too, probably more than could be recounted in this space.

In all counts, it would be a grave mistake for the Arab world to repeat the errors of the past and to follow the policy set out by Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and later followed by Syria, Iraq, South Yemen and others in the late 1950s, 60s and 70s.

Any rallying to the "Russian side" at this juncture would only result in a stiff penalty for the Arab world in dividing itself along pro- and anti-West, taking us back to the worst years of the Cold War where the Arab world stagnated economically, forever indebted to the Soviets for arms and munitions that were always a step or two behind those of the West.

No doubt the United States has not been the Arab world's best friend in recent years but abandoning it now at a time of need, as tempting as it might appear in some Arab capitals would be a fatal mistake. It is high time the Arab world engaged in some serious forward planning and conducted policy with the mind rather than the heart.