The summit location itself is the starting point, in the former Warsaw Pact nation of Romania, now a member of the European Union, whose strategic position on the shores of the Black Sea and its welcome for American and NATO aircraft has turned the almost landlocked sea into a NATO, as opposed to a Soviet lake. This offers useful insurance against NATO's growing worry that Turkey's civilian leaders, if not the military, may be turning their back on the West.

Two other Black Sea countries, the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia have been hammering on NATO's door for entry this week. German-led worries about offending Russia have put this project on hold for the moment, but NATO insisted that it rejected any thought of a Russian veto over future NATO membership, and the trend is clear. NATO sees the Black Sea not just as a new frontier but as its back yard.

Then consider the implications of the other headline feature of the summit, the decision of France's new President Nicolas Sarkozy, to bring France back into full NATO membership after 40 years of semi-detachment.

First, this follows France's new military basing deployment at Abu Dhabi in the Gulf, a deal reached earlier this year with the United Arab Emirates and exemplified last month in a series of war games involving 12,000 French, UAE and Qatari troops.

Second, this comes with French reinforcements and a renewed commitment to the NATO mission in Afghanistan.

Then ponder the implications of the other main issue of the summit, the plan to deploy American anti-missiles systems in Poland (the missiles) and the Czech Republic (the radars). Despite considerable disquiet over the strength of Russian opposition to these deployments, NATO has now effectively approved the deal, which is intended to provide insurance and protection against the putative threat of missiles from Iran.

Add all this together and the three cardinal locations of NATO interest that emerge are the Black Sea (Turkey), the Gulf (Iran) and Afghanistan. And the NATO countries were prepared for a serious argument with Russia, Europe's main energy supplier, to assert NATO's interests in the wider Middle East.

There is nothing necessarily sinister about this, although some NATO voters may be surprised to realize just how far the Alliance has shifted its geographic focus. Much of this shift was foreshadowed by the immediate American responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but they are now becoming institutionalized into NATO's core strategy. The implications, for the peoples of the Middle East as well as NATO, are likely to be profound.