In the last 27 centuries, when it to comes war, not much has changed; the first step toward victory still requires to know one's enemy, his logistics, his physical and psychological strengths – and weaknesses – as well as his potential to regroup and fight back. The Bush administration's lack of knowledge of the enemy in Iraq, or perhaps this administration's decision to ignore those very fundamental points is the reason the United States is still fighting in Iraq five years after what in essence was projected – and expected – to have been a short military campaign.
Historians and military tacticians still consult Sun Tzu's philosophy on war. Similarly, historians and generals will, for decades to come, go over the war plans of George W. Bush to learn how to avoid becoming embroiled in similar misadventures. Consider that in those past five years the war in Iraq has become America's costliest in monetary terms: $503,340,121,100 and counting. Such large sums are difficult to get a handle on. This will help place it in better perspective: $275 million per day; $4,100 per household. As for human casualties, almost 4,000 U.S. soldiers killed and more than 60,000 wounded. Iraqis have paid a far higher price with more than 700,000 killed and 4 million refugees.
Chances are history will not be kind to the planners of the Iraq war: let's rephrase that. In fact, the plan for the initial combat phase of the operation was brilliant: The buildup of forces, the rapid invasion, the drive up from the Kuwaiti border to Baghdad and beyond in about two weeks; low casualties for the invading forces, was, as far as military planners are concerned, as good as it gets. It was quick, surgical, and the desired objectives were met in record time. Indeed, the military phase of the invasion and occupation of Iraq – or liberation as some prefer to call it – could not have been any smoother. The problem came in the post-combat phase of the occupation/liberation. That was the result of failing to know your enemy before confronting him.
In their study of the Iraq War historians will examine three major mistakes committed in the post-combat days. First was the failure of rallying the bulk of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's army, either by exerting political pressure or by offering them financial incentives. Those troops should have been immediately deployed in Baghdad, Basra and the other major cities to prevent the mayhem, looting and sheer pandemonium that followed the arrival of U.S. and coalition forces in the country. It took the good part of four years to finally conclude that the loyalty of Sunni tribesmen could be bought.
American and British troops were not prepared or trained to act as policemen in Iraq, a task the Iraqi military at the time knew only too well how to carry out. The ferreting out of Saddam loyalists could have been carried out gradually over the next year or two, replacing them with untainted officers.
The second mistake was the much-too-quick de-Baathification program implemented by the U.S. civilian administrator Paul Bremer.
The third mistake, and on which much of everything else can be blamed, was not following rule number one of warfare, what Sun Tzu had known six centuries before the modern era.