As the Annapolis summit on the Israeli-Arab conflict looms closer, the impression becomes stronger that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is "winging it" - pushing ahead with an ambitious, maximalist agenda she has no chance of achieving.
US influence over Hamas, the absolute masters of Gaza, is zero. So is US leverage with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Far from an Israeli government exercising some kind of veto over Washington, it is Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who has been trying to send signals to Damascus that he would like to deal with President
Bashar Al Assad. But he has received no support or encouragement worth the name from Rice. Nor has the secretary of state shown the slightest indication of being willing to open any serious negotiations with Iran. Secretary Rice should be under no illusions that any significant agreement from Annapolis without Syrian and Iranian participation will hold.
Rice's passion for Annapolis, instead, looks likely to undermine the two leaders who have the most to gain from reaching agreement and bolstering each other: Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas. Both men are already being undermined by aggressive forces in their own constituencies. The Israeli military establishment is leaking stories to the Tel Aviv press designed to embarrass Abbas and, ultimately, Olmert, by presenting the PA president as being too weak to make any deal stick. Nor does Abbas lack challengers of his own on the West Bank.
More limited, working agreements between Olmert and Abbas are desirable and quite achievable. Both men recognize it is in their mutual interest to try and make a deal that improves the miserable economic conditions of Palestinians on the West Bank. But Annapolis is not designed to strengthen Olmert and Abbas by giving them the chance to exceed modest expectations. By its nature, it raises prospects of a far more comprehensive peace that neither man is yet in any position to deliver. It, therefore, runs the risk of fatally discrediting them both at the expense of far more extreme forces in both camps.
The lasting triumphs in Israeli-Arab peace diplomacy were never achieved by one shot wonders like Annapolis. The Camp David I summit and ensuing 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty were preceded by years of intensive diplomatic activity. The progress made under the Oslo Peace Process came out of seven years of top level US commitment - not merely from secretaries of state Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright, but also from the president they served: Bill Clinton. President George W. Bush has shown no signs of rolling up his sleeves and pitching into the peace process that way.
Betting all America's Middle East chips on the success of Annapolis is a risky business. There is still time to dampen expectations and bolster Abbas and Olmert for the long haul. But Rice shows no sign of doing so.
Editorial: Annapolis - a shortcut to failure
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