The George W. Bush administration must stop its bellicose public denunciation of Iran and exhaust all diplomatic options first before considering any other coercive measures to bring Tehran to heed.

Whereas the question of whether or not Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons remains murky at best, neither the International Atomic Energy Agency nor Russia nor China is convinced that Tehran is in fact seeking nuclear weapons.

The Bush administration's policy of intimidation, sanctions, and threats of regime change has done nothing but further embolden Tehran to defy not only Washington, but also the international community, and to do so with impunity. Moreover, the administration's negotiation with North Korea was not lost to Iran. Pyongyang's adamant refusal to give up their nuclear program before sitting face-to-face with the Americans and receiving much of the economic incentive along with security guaranties that it has demanded, offered a telling lesson to the Iranian ruling clergy. Iran's propensity for playing for time was only encouraged by the administration's conduct and inability to fashion a coherent policy that could mobilize the international community to act in concert against Iran. Thus, playing for time by stalling and resorting to ambiguities and contradictions served Iran's designs well, whatever they may be.

If the US government wishes to make a real case against Iran or attempt to resolve the impasse - especially if the Islamic republic is pursuing nuclear weapons - then a change of direction must occur now. The White House must not make conditional direct negotiation with Tehran on the suspension of the enrichment of uranium. Instead, to prevent Iran from using its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the provisions of Non-Proliferation Treaty while playing Russia and China against the EU and the United States, the White House must enter into direct and unconditional negotiations, along with its European partners, for a limited period of, say, three months. During this time, a negotiated settlement must be hammered out that satisfies both the United States and Iran, which can be expected to be supported by Russia and China. This approach will allow Tehran to continue to enrich uranium only during the negotiation, satisfying Iran's main demand. But permanent suspension will be the result rather than the precondition of the negotiations. The other option discussed, seeking new and more severe UN economic sanctions, as the administration threatens to do, will be ineffective, since it is nothing more than a smokescreen. As long as Russia and China do not feel that the United States has exhausted all diplomatic channels, they will not agree to support anything but a watered down resolution that can neither be enforced universally nor inflict real hardship on Iran.

It was the George W. Bush administration that turned down Iran's offer in early 2003 to negotiate a comprehensive peaceful settlement between the two sides. Therefore, the burden is on Mr. Bush, who must now make a far more credible case against Iran before he can convince a most skeptical American public of Tehran's genuine nuclear threats. Thus, only through face-to-face negotiations will the Bush administration be in a position to discern the true intentions of the Iranian government and draw the proper conclusion.