When the popular uprising, propelled by Islamic fervor and initiated largely by students and Tehran bazaar shop owners, overthrew the shah in 1979, the mullahs and ayatollahs believed Iran would rapidly export its Islamic revolution. The expectation was that Iran would spread fundamentalism, in much the same way that the Soviet Union exported socialism to dozens of countries around the world, uniting them in a pact against the West.

But although the mullahs, ayatollahs, and associated revolutionary guards tried to interest countries to follow in their footsteps, they ultimately failed. Not one country has adopted the Iranian system. Yes, Iran had limited success installing a detachment of ‘guardians of the revolution’ in Lebanon, thanks to a power vacuum created by Lebanon’s civil war. The Iranians were thus able to temporarily Islamize parts of Beirut’s southern suburbs and the historic Bekaa Valley town of Baalbek, as well as a string of hamlets in southern Lebanon. But even in those locations, chadors and Islamic headscarves mix freely with skin-tight Western denims, Nike T-shirts, and NY Yankee baseball caps. In short, Iran’s revolution was ‘unsellable’ outside its borders.

Now, some 25 years later, Iran is beginning to swing toward the moderate center. As Amir Taheri, an Iranian-born writer recently pointed out, “Iran is coming around.” Nicholas Kristof, just returned from a trip to Iran, writes in the New York Times , “The Iranian regime is destined for the ash heap of history.”

With elections still rigged, the country has a long way to go before it can be confused with anything resembling a democracy. Nevertheless, it is a very different Iran from the one that ousted the shah, and that two and a half decades ago hanged from construction cranes anyone who dared to oppose the Islamic revolution. And with a large, young population born after the revolution, the changes will continue apace.

“We do not want the Islam of the Taliban,” said Atta Allah Muhajirani, an Iranian official, speaking at a conference in Kuwait on ‘Iran and the Future.’ But, said Muhajirani, “nor do we want the Islam that Bush saved.”

So what does Iran want today?

There is little doubt whatsoever that Iran strongly desires to establish itself as a regional power in the Persian/Arabian Gulf region, as well as in the Middle East. Iran has been supporting Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories in their fight against Israel. Iran has trained, financed, and armed both groups – which the US state department considers to be engaged in terrorist activities and has placed on its terror watch list. Iran has tried to influence Lebanese politics, whenever possible, through the Hizbullah militia and the Hizbullah political system, now represented in the Lebanese parliament. The government in Tehran has, in the past, supported terrorist groups and has even engaged in terrorist activities itself.

Iran has had dreams of attaining regional superiority since the days of the shah. And while much has changed in Tehran under the mullahs, Iran’s ‘need’ to enjoy junior-superpower status does not seem to have abated in any way.

However, if Iran’s desire to export revolution has somewhat ebbed, it still very much wants to remain involved in regional politics – such as in Iraq where Iranian agents are very active in their support of the Shia community. Iran is widely believed to be backing the troublesome cleric, Moqtada Al Sadr. Furthermore, the Islamic republic still holds high hopes of becoming a nuclear power. Despite cat-and-mouse games with the International Atomic Energy Agency, many observers believe that Iran is proceeding with plans to become the second nuclear power in the Middle East, after Israel, and the second Muslim nation, after Pakistan. And while Iran may not actually produce a nuclear device, it may well be proceeding with learning and preparing the technology that will allow it to build one.

Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy warned that “Iran’s nuclear activities threaten the Gulf and the world.” Clawson said Iran could be initiating a nuclear arms race between Gulf countries, forcing Saudi Arabia, for example, to feel threatened enough to develop its own nuclear program.

Iran, today, will do everything it can to maintain its status in the region. The great peril in that is a danger of confrontation with Israel. All indications seem to confirm that Israel will not sit back and allow Iran to develop a military nuclear capability. Under such circumstances, a repeat performance of the strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility is almost a given. The relevant question here is what would Iran’s response be? Given that Iran still commands much influence over Lebanon’s Hizbullah, an Israeli preemptive strike on the Islamic republic’s nuclear sites would undoubtedly unleash military or guerrilla action along the Lebanese-Israeli border.

As Anthony Cordesman, a Middle East specialist and national security analyst for ABC News, told a weekend conference in Kuwait, “Rational stability is not characteristic of the region.”

Maybe for that very reason the long overdue dialogue between Iran and the United States might just get off the ground, thinks Cordesman, who said the name calling – ‘Axis of Evil’ vs. ‘Great Satan’ – has to stop as it will get both countries nowhere. The trick is to create a climate of trust.

Trust Iran? Unlikely, say many Kuwaitis who live next door and like to keep a watchful eye on their powerful neighbor. Muhammad Al Jassem, editor in chief of the Kuwaiti daily newspaper Al Watan and Newsweek in Arabic believes the Iranians are difficult to trust and says Iranians have been “increasingly active” in Iraq, where their intelligence services are positioning themselves for the post-US occupation period.

“The Iranians know that the United States will one day have to leave Iraq,” said Jassem. And the Iranians also know that they will be around long after that.

Claude Salhani is international editor at United Press International