In his January 29 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush said, "The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."

Those two criteria – dangerous regimes with destructive weapons - are most readily applicable to Iraq. Iraq has the only regime in the world that has not denounced the September 11 attacks, and also the only regime in the world that the United Nations Security Council has ordered to give up weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The president further emphasized, "I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer."

The focus of counter-terrorism efforts throughout the U.S. government is on preventing new attacks, not simply responding to attacks that have occurred. Bush's stance on these issues has drawn strong support from such leading democrats as Senator Joseph Lieberman and former Vice President Al Gore.

All of these factors – the analysis of the threat, the focus on prevention, and the bipartisan support - lead to the conclusion that the time to deal with the Iraq problem has arrived.

It is still largely unclear, however, what exactly will be done about Iraq. Those who wish to avoid the use of force still have an opportunity to show that the Iraqi WMD threat can be eliminated peacefully.

Yet, time is short, and so far, little has been done to this effect by the parties so inclined, such as the French or the Russians. The Security Council is set to discuss Iraq by May 30, and the role of arms inspections should be a key issue in these discussions.

There are several problems with relying on inspectors:

o Were inspections to resume, there would be no concrete results for months, during which time the Iraqis could create many obstacles to the inspectors. This problem is made worse by Security Council resolutions that offer Iraq a suspension of sanctions as soon as it begins cooperating with inspections. Once the sanctions are suspended, Iraq would have little incentive to allow further inspections.

o Saddam Hussein has shown no intention of cooperating with any form of inspection, as was made clear in his response to Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's recent letter calling for the return of the inspectors. Allowing the inspectors to return threatens Hussein: his rule depends on his all-powerful image, which would be dented if he had to bow to U.S. demands.

o The Bush administration is not as dedicated to international arms control agreements as its predecessors have been, and it is sure to reject the suggestion that some inspections, even if imperfect, are better than none. While he is in the region, Vice President Dick Cheney should convey that the U.S. intends to act on the Iraqi question while working with its partners on the operational modalities and addressing their concerns as best as possible.

It would be premature to discuss the specifics of how the U.S. would use force if need be. Tough decisions about the general strategy of any such military operation remain, in particular:

- Move slowly or quickly? Patience would provide an opportunity to organize Iraqi opposition forces and replenish ammunition stocks. Swift action, on the other hand, could shorten the time Hussein has to prepare countermeasures, such as the use of WMD.

- Go heavy or light? A large U.S. ground force would maximize the prospect for quick victory, increasing the chances that many Iraqi soldiers would desert or defect. However, relying on Iraqi opposition for ground forces would enable the victory to appear more as a liberation of Iraq from within, adding credibility to the post-war Iraqi government.Patrick Clawson is the Director for Research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. (Prepared by Natan Sachs)